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Executive Summary  
 
A study on the status of Natech risk reduction in EU Member States was performed by means of a 
questionnaire survey. The results of the analysis are based on 14 country responses which is too 
small a population size for drawing robust statistical conclusions. As a consequence, the 
quantitative results of this study and their interpretation may be subject to some uncertainty. 
However, a clear tendency towards recognising natural hazards as an important external risk 
source for chemical facilities could be established. In addition, more than half of the responding 
countries declared to have suffered one or more Natech accidents with the release of toxic 
substances, fires and/or explosions and sometimes fatalities and injuries. The natural events that 
triggered these Natech accidents were not necessarily the ones that were believed to be of major 
concern so there is a discrepancy between actual causes and risk perception. 
 
A legal framework for Natech risk reduction exists via the responding countries’ chemical-
accident prevention programmes, but the effectiveness of these programmes in mitigating Natech 
risk is largely inconclusive. The occurrence of Natech accidents indicates that there may be gaps 
in legislation, implementation and/or its monitoring that should be addressed to ensure effective 
Natech risk reduction. In over half the responding countries Natech risk is not addressed in 
natural-disaster management regulations. Existing technical codes and standards for the design, 
construction and operation of buildings and structures in industry consider certain natural hazards 
but their ultimate goal is the safety of human life. Therefore, the prevention of hazardous-
substance releases may not be guaranteed and secondary risks due to these releases may not be 
taken into account. Additionally, some of these technical codes and standards may not be suitable 
for controlling risks due to hazardous substances. Specific guidelines for Natech risk reduction to 
support legislation are scarce. Therefore, the development of specific technical codes and 
guidelines would be required to fully address Natech risk in the EU Member States. 
 
Awareness of Natech risk seems to be increasing within the countries’ competent authorities 
while there is a tendency to believe that the current level of knowledge on the dynamics of 
Natech accidents may not be adequate. Consequently, training on Natech risk reduction is needed. 
There is the perception among the respondents that there is a certain level of Natech awareness in 
industry, although in almost half of the responding countries industry does not appear to 
sufficiently take Natech risk into account in industrial risk assessment. In addition, there is a 
reported lack of Natech-specific scenarios. Low levels of Natech preparedness could therefore 
have resulted. This highlights the need for better risk communication and the development of 
methodologies and tools for including Natech risk into conventional industrial risk assessment. 
Moreover, the development of guidance on Natech risk assessment for industry was indicated as 
the highest-priority need for effective risk reduction, closely followed by the development of 
guidance on Natech risk assessment at the community level.  
 
Natech risk reduction measures seem to be widely available although they are often generic due 
to the absence of data and models on the dynamics of Natech accidents. In fact, currently no 
specific Natech accident databases exist in the responding countries and Natech events have to be 
retrieved from conventional chemical-accident databases which lack the level of detail to capture 
the specifics on Natech accidents. Moreover, chemical-accident prevention and pollution-control 
regulations, such as the Seveso II Directive, do not provide guidance to the operator on how 
Natech risk reduction should be achieved, nor to the competent authority on how to evaluate that 
the risk level is as low as required by regulations. This is a shortcoming that needs to be 
addressed. Some Natech risk reduction measures that could be considered best practice were 
reported to exist; most provided examples were, however, targeted towards floods. This finding 
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suggests that awareness of or the availability of Natech-specific best practices may be limited at 
present and actions should be directed towards filling this gap, e.g. through a concerted effort to 
identify existing best practices and to disseminate them widely. Another priority need expressed 
by the survey respondents is the development of specific Natech risk maps whose availability is 
very limited. These are required for the identification of Natech-prone areas to inform land-use-
planning and emergency-management decisions. In contrast, several countries have developed 
natural hazard or risk maps for selected natural hazards in certain regions.  
 
The results of this Natech questionnaire survey show that the responding countries have largely 
recognised natural hazards and disasters as a relevant source of risk to a chemical facility with the 
potential to trigger a major accident. A framework for Natech risk reduction exists but a strategic 
Natech risk-reduction initiative appears to be lacking. Moreover, the survey highlighted a number 
of shortcomings and gaps that need to be addressed to achieve effective risk reduction. 
Considering the findings of this study the following areas for future work were identified: 
 
• Raising awareness and improving risk communication at all levels of government and in 
industry; 
• The implementation and enforcement of specific regulations for Natech risk reduction; 
• The preparation of specific technical codes and of guidelines for risk assessment in industry 
that address the characteristics of Natech risk; 
• The development of guidance on Natech risk assessment at the community level; 
• The development of methods and tools for Natech risk assessment; 
• The preparation of dedicated Natech emergency management plans which consider the 
characteristics of Natech accidents (e.g. a possible lack of utilities); 
• Identification of best practices for Natech risk reduction and wide dissemination of existing 
practices;  
• The development of Natech risk maps to support effective land-use planning and emergency 
management; 
• Land-use planning that explicitly addresses Natech risk; 
• Training of competent authorities on Natech risk reduction both for officials in charge of 
chemical-accident prevention and those in charge of natural-disaster management; 
• Research into the impact of climate change on future Natech risk. 
 
In order to support the process of improving Natech risk reduction, lessons learned from the 
analysis of past Natech accidents should be formulated and disseminated. These lessons should 
address failure modes and hazardous-substance release paths as a function of natural-hazard 
severity, as well as identify risk-reduction measures and possible best practices. As this requires 
the systematic collection of data on the causes and dynamics of Natech events the JRC has set up 
a specific Natech accident database which is public to allow the widest possible access to the 
accident data. Moreover, indicators for measuring the effectiveness and adequacy of Natech risk-
reduction measures should be developed. 
 3
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .......................................................................................................................... 1 
1 INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................................................................... 4 
2 SAMPLE DESCRIPTION........................................................................................................................ 4 
3 REGULATIONS FOR THE PREVENTION AND MITIGATION OF NATECH ACCIDENTS .... 5 
3.1 REGULATIONS AND GUIDELINES FOR CHEMICAL-ACCIDENT PREVENTION AND MITIGATION ................. 5 
3.2 REGULATIONS AND GUIDELINES FOR NATURAL-DISASTER MANAGEMENT ............................................ 7 
3.3 EFFECTIVENESS OF REGULATIONS ........................................................................................................ 8 
3.4 CONCLUSIONS ON REGULATIONS FOR THE PREVENTION AND MITIGATION OF NATECH ACCIDENTS .... 11 
4 NATECH EVENTS DATA COLLECTION AND RETRIEVAL....................................................... 12 
4.1 CONCLUSIONS ON NATECH EVENTS DATA COLLECTION AND RETRIEVAL............................................ 12 
5 LEARNING FROM NATECH ACCIDENTS: CASE HISTORIES .................................................. 12 
5.1 CONCLUSIONS ON LEARNING FROM NATECH ACCIDENTS ................................................................... 14 
6 NATECH AWARENESS AND RISK REDUCTION .......................................................................... 15 
6.1 CONCLUSIONS ON NATECH AWARENESS AND RISK REDUCTION.......................................................... 30 
7 IDENTIFYING NEEDS AND LIMITATIONS.................................................................................... 31 
7.1 CONCLUSIONS ON IDENTIFYING NEEDS AND LIMITATIONS .................................................................. 44 
8 CONCLUSIONS...................................................................................................................................... 45 
ANNEX A – GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS OVERSEEING CHEMICAL-ACCIDENT 
PREVENTION, AND RULES, CODES AND GUIDELINES FOR HAZARDOUS-SUBSTANCES 
HANDLING................................................................................................................................................ 48 
ANNEX B – NATURAL HAZARDS IN REGULATIONS, TECHNICAL CODES, STANDARD OR 
GUIDELINES, AND NATECH-SPECIFIC RISK-REDUCTION GUIDELINES .............................. 60 
ANNEX C – GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS OVERSEEING NATURAL-DISASTER 
MANAGEMENT, AND RULES, CODES OR GUIDELINES USED................................................... 69 
ANNEX D – RULES, CODES AND GUIDELINES FOR NATURAL-DISASTER MANAGEMENT 
THAT RESTRICT HAZARDOUS-SUBSTANCES HANDLING......................................................... 80 
ANNEX E – LIST OF NATECH ACCIDENTS PROVIDED BY THE SURVEY PARTICIPANTS 83 
ANNEX F – QUESTIONNAIRE USED IN THE FRAME OF THE NATECH SURVEY................ 100 
 4
1 Introduction 
 
The last decade has seen a growing body of research on chemical accidents triggered by natural 
hazards and disasters (so-called Natech accidents), and awareness of Natech risk as an emerging 
risk is growing in Europe. However, there is little information on the actual status of Natech risk 
reduction in the Member States of the European Union. Therefore, the European Commission’s 
Joint Research Centre (JRC) launched a questionnaire survey to assess Natech risk management 
practices and awareness of Natech accidents, collect case histories and lessons learned, and 
identify needs and/or limitations in implementing Natech risk reduction strategies in the EU. The 
results of the survey are intended to lead to better designed and targeted Natech risk reduction 
strategies. A similar survey was performed by the JRC within the frame of the OECD Working 
Group on Chemical Accidents for OECD Member Countries, the results of which have been 
published in Krausmann and Baranzini (2009)1. 
 
In March 2009 the JRC questionnaire was sent to the members of the EU Seveso Committee of 
the Competent Authorities with a request to complete the questionnaire and involve other 
stakeholders outside government and administration in the respective Member States as far as 
practicable. The deadline for submitting the survey responses was June, 2009, although a number 
of filled-in questionnaires arrived after the deadline and in 2010. Overall, 14 EU Member States 
returned the completed questionnaire. These countries are (in alphabetical order): Austria (2009), 
Cyprus (2010), Czech Republic (2009), France (2009), Germany (2009), Italy (2009), Lithuania 
(2009), Luxemburg (2009), Netherlands (2009), Poland (2009), Romania (2010), Slovakia2 
(2010), Sweden (2009) and the United Kingdom (2009). The numbers in brackets indicate the 
year in which the data was provided and hence represent the Natech risk management status at the 
time of questionnaire submission. It is possible that in some cases part of the provided 
information, in particular legal acts, may have been superseded at the time of publication of this 
report. The responses to the questionnaire were analysed and the results are discussed in the 
following. The questionnaire template used in the survey is presented in Annex F.  
 
2 Sample description 
 
This analysis is based on 14 responses and therefore captures only about half of the 27 EU 
Member States. However, the 14 responding countries are home to over 76% of chemical 
facilities that fall under the provisions of the EU Seveso II Directive3,4, which motivates the 
assessment of their status in terms of Natech risk reduction. Where basic descriptive statistics was 
used in the analysis, the interpretation of the quantitative results is subject to some uncertainty 
due to the small sample size. In order to increase the robustness of our interpretation, special 
attention was given to the survey respondents’ individual comments or explanatory remarks. 
However, due to the incompleteness of the data the main purpose of this study is to paint a 
                                                 
1 E. Krausmann, D. Baranzini (2009) Natech risk reduction in OECD Member Countries: Results of a 
questionnaire survey, JRC 54120, European Commission, Joint Research Centre. 
2 The questionnaire response from Slovakia was prepared by the University of Žilina and does not represent 
the official reply of the Slovak Government. 
3 Seveso Plant Information Retrieval System (SPIRS), September 2010.  
4 European Union (1997) Council Directive 96/82/EC of 9 December 1996 on the control of major-accident 
hazards involving dangerous substances, Official J of the European Communities L10. 
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qualitative picture of the Natech risk management situation in the responding Member States 
rather than carrying out a detailed quantitative study. 
 
All responding organisations belong to the public sector with 12 responses from competent 
authorities in the respective countries and 2 responses from academia. The organisations’ main 
responsibilities are shown in Figure 1. Environment with 29% is leading the classification, 
followed by civil protection with 21%. All responding organisations operate at national level. 
 
The survey was answered mainly based on the respondent’s own professional expertise and 
experience and by discussion with colleagues (Table 1). 
  
 
 
Figure 1: Main responsibilities of responding organisations (number and percentage of replies). 
 
 
Process used Number of replies (%) 
Participant’s own knowledge 9 (64) 
Discussion with participant’s colleagues 9 (64) 
Participant’s records 4 (27) 
Meeting 3 (21) 
 
Table 1: Process used by the survey respondents for questionnaire completion. 
 
3 Regulations for the prevention and mitigation of 
Natech accidents 
3.1 Regulations and guidelines for chemical-accident prevention 
and mitigation 
 
The first part of the survey aimed at identifying existing regulations for chemical-accident 
prevention and natural-disaster management, as well as technical codes and standards that 
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consider the impact of natural hazards. The government institution(s) overseeing chemical-
accident prevention and mitigation, and the rules, codes or guidelines used in the respective 
country to regulate or guide hazardous-substances handling are summarised in Tables A1 and A2 
in Annex A. 
 
The Seveso Directive requires external hazards (including natural events) to be considered in the 
Safety Report of hazardous installations. Out of the 13 respondents to the question, 10 (77%) 
indicated that the rules, codes or guidelines indicated in Table A2 implicitly or explicitly address 
the natural hazards their respective country is subject to, while 3 (23%) replied in the negative 
(Figure 2). The survey participants were requested to provide details on the specific document, 
the natural hazard(s) considered, as well as the impact on hazardous-substances handling for the 
cases where chemical accident prevention legislation considers natural hazards. This information 
is listed in Table B1 in Annex B. The cited documents influence the handling of hazardous 
materials e.g. by requiring the preparation of a safety document that considers the potential 
impact of a selected natural hazard, a site-specific risk assessment, or in some cases the restriction 
of industrial development in areas prone to selected natural hazards. 
 
With respect to specific technical codes, standards or guidelines for the design, construction and 
operation of buildings and other structures in industry that consider natural hazards, 9 responding 
organisations (69%) indicated that these were available in their respective countries (Figure 2). 
Details on these documents and the natural hazard(s) considered can be found in Table B2 in 
Annex B. A closer look at the provided information revealed that in many cases only selected 
natural hazards that a country is subject to are considered while others are neglected. In addition, 
while technical standards and guidelines are designed to protect buildings and other structures 
during natural events to ensure the safety of human life, they may not give appropriate 
consideration to installations housing hazardous substances. Therefore, the prevention of 
hazardous-substances releases may not necessarily be guaranteed and secondary risks to human 
life and the environment due to these releases may not be addressed. In 4 cases (31%) 
organisations replied that no such technical codes or guidelines exist in their countries. 
 
3
5
9
9
10
10
7
3
4
3
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14
Does your country have guidelines specific for Natech risk
reduction? (1e)
Do the natural-disaster management rules restrict
hazardous-substances processing, use or storage in
natural-hazard areas? (2c)
Is your country developing a programme to address the
problem of Natech events? (1f)
Are there specific technical codes and standards for the
design, construction and operation of buildings and other
structures in industry that consider natural hazards? (1d)
Do the rules for chemical accident prevention address the
natural hazards your country is susceptible to? (1c)
Replies received
Yes
No
 
Figure 2: Survey replies to Questions 1c - 1f and 2c on regulations, codes and standards for the 
prevention and mitigation of Natech accidents. 
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Guidelines specific for Natech risk reduction exist in only 3 (23%) countries while the vast 
majority of the respondents (77%) replied in the negative. These guidelines, however, address 
only selected natural hazards a country is subject to. Details on these guidelines including the title 
and year of documents, as well as the natural hazard(s) considered are provided in Table B3 in 
Annex B. 
 
The question on whether the country or organisation is developing a strategy or programme to 
address the problem of Natech accidents was answered by 12 countries. Out of these, 9 (75%) are 
working on this topic while 3 respondents (25%) replied in the negative (Figure 2). For the 9 
countries which are developing a strategy or programme to address Natech accidents, the 
considered natural hazards are summarised in Table 2. The fact that the majority of the 
responding countries are in the process of developing specific Natech risk reduction programmes 
suggests that Natech risk has been recognised as an emerging risk. It also indicates that while a 
general legislative framework for Natech risk reduction seems to be in place, the countries 
acknowledge the need to address the lack of detailed knowledge on Natech risk which may have 
resulted in gaps in Natech accident prevention.  
 
 
Country Natural hazard considered 
Czech Republic Mainly floods 
France Floods, earthquakes, lightning, landslides (focus on soil/structure 
interaction) 
Germany Precipitation, floods, storms, earthquakes 
Italy Hydro-geological events, earthquakes, winds, rain, lightning, 
wildfires 
Lithuania Floods 
Netherlands All-hazards approach 
Romania Floods, landslides, earthquakes 
Slovakia Floods 
UK Mainly floods 
 
Table 2: Natural hazards considered in EU Member State programmes that address Natech risk. 
 
3.2 Regulations and guidelines for natural-disaster management 
 
The government institution(s) overseeing natural-disaster management, as well as the rules, codes 
or guidelines used in the respective country to address natural-disaster management are listed in 
Tables C1 and C2 in Annex C. 
 
In 7 cases (58%) out of a total sample size of 12 for this particular question, respondents indicated 
that natural-disaster management rules, codes or guidelines in their respective countries do not 
restrict hazardous-substances processing, use or storage in areas subject to natural hazards (Figure 
2). In 5 cases (42%) restrictions were reported. These restrictions apply for some or all natural 
hazards and include siting objections for new installations in hazard-prone areas or site-specific 
prevention measures including a dedicated risk assessment. Details on the specific documents, the 
natural hazard(s) considered and the impact on hazardous-substances handling are listed in Table 
D1 in Annex D. 
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3.3 Effectiveness of regulations 
 
We asked survey participants if they thought that their country’s approach to chemical-accident 
prevention and natural-disaster management had been effective in preventing Natech accidents. 
Their opinion had to be ranked on a scale from 1 (low effectiveness) to 5 (highly effective). The 
ranking of the individual answers is shown in Figure 3. Additional information by some 
respondents who commented their answer to this question is shown in Table 35. 
 
 
Figure 3: Ranking of the effectiveness of a country’s approach to chemical-accident prevention in 
reducing Natech risk. 
 
 
The resulting mean value of effectiveness is about 3.3 based on a sample size of 11 countries 
which answered this question. This mean value indicates that there seems to be a slightly positive 
tendency towards considering the countries’ approach to chemical-accident prevention and 
natural-disaster management to some extent effective in preventing Natech events. A detailed 
analysis of the replies to this question in conjunction with the individual responses to Questions 
1c to 1e (Figure 2) indicates that there does not seem to be a relationship between the perceived 
effectiveness and the availability of regulations, technical codes and guidelines that consider 
natural hazards. In fact, in some countries which considered the effectiveness to be medium-high 
or high, this judgement seems to be based on the absence of Natech accidents rather than the 
existence of specific regulations. However, the non-occurrence of accidents is not necessarily an 
adequate indicator of effectiveness. In some cases, the existence of regulations and their 
enforcement, or the drawing up of action plans on prevention, preparedness and response is 
                                                 
5 The numbering in this and the following tables is arbitrary. Identical numbering in tables does not 
necessarily indicate responses from the same country. 
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considered an indicator of effectiveness. However, it is unclear what the state of implementation 
and monitoring is. 
 
With this insight the conclusion drawn from the replies to this question is that it is inconclusive 
from this survey whether the current approach for chemical-accident prevention and natural-
disaster management in EU Member States is sufficient to prevent Natech accidents. The fact that 
some countries have experienced Natech events and have launched dedicated Natech risk-
reduction strategies and research activities (see the following sections) suggests that it may not 
be. 
 
 Comment on the effectiveness of regulations 
1 Most scenarios developed under our country’s national safety strategy are covered in 
current policies and regulation. 
2 It is very difficult to evaluate which accidents were prevented. 
3 The situation of Natech mitigation in my country is rather satisfactory. An asset in 
terms of mitigation is the existence of numerous regulatory texts, with appropriate 
State services for enforcing them. In addition, regularly updated maps help identify 
those natural hazards industrial facilities may be confronted with. 
4 The main threat is caused by flooding where an effective prevention tradition exists 
and no major accident (spill etc.) happened during the last events. Some hazard types 
are not relevant as there are no sites within the consequence area (avalanches). 
5 Some Natechs due to flood events but not serious damage. 
6 There are no specific (technical) regulations for Natech hazards, and there are no 
standards for risk assessment criteria for technological installations influenced by 
natural hazards. 
7 My country is susceptible to quite a narrow range of natural disasters. The Law on 
Civil Protection establishes the legal and organisational framework for the 
organisation and functioning of the civil protection and rescue system, describes the 
activities comprising the preparedness of state and municipal institutions, all 
economic entities, public organizations and residents for an emergency, actions in the 
event of occurrence thereof and response thereto, also the use of all resources of the 
State for the survival of residents, maintaining the viability of the national economy, 
protection of the property and the environment against the effects of the emergency, 
with the citizens actively participating in the processes. Emergency here shall mean a 
situation caused by natural, technical, ecological or social factors or military actions 
and posing a sudden and grave hazard to human life or to health, property, nature or 
causing death and mutilation or property losses. The Law requires the head of an 
economic entity or an institution to project emergencies and plan preventive measures 
and to draw up and approve plans of civil protection preparedness for an emergency. 
State institutions, counties and municipalities shall draw up plans of action in the 
event of a radiation accident at the Nuclear Power Plant and prepare means of 
protection of residents and measures aimed at responding to the effects of the disaster 
outside the territory of hazardous establishments and included in plans of civil 
protection preparedness for an emergency (external emergency plans). The procedure 
for preventing, responding to and investigating industrial accidents is laid down by the 
Regulations on Prevention of, Response to and Investigation of Industrial Accidents, 
approved by the Government. Considering what is stated we can maintain that the 
national approach to chemical-accident prevention and natural-disaster management 
has been quite effective in preventing Natech accidents. 
8 Prevention on Natechs is implemented only in the area of floods and major accidents. 
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But there are no strict obligations or methods which are able to prevent this type of 
risk. It is important to implement more obligations (or stricter obligations) in laws of 
operators of plants to analyse the influence of floods. 
 
Table 3: Respondents’ comments on the effectiveness of regulations in preventing Natech 
accidents. 
  
As conclusion to the questionnaire section on regulations for Natech accident prevention and 
mitigation we asked the participating countries if they felt that there were gaps or shortcomings in 
their country’s rules or codes that needed to be addressed to ensure effective Natech risk 
reduction. Table 4 collects the opinions of the 7 respondents on what improvements could or 
should be made to current regulations, codes and/or guidelines. From the table it is evident that 
there is a perceived need for improving current regulations and filling existing gaps to fully 
address the Natech risk a country or region may be subject to. The main proposals for 
improvements include:  
 
• The implementation and enforcement of specific regulations for Natech risk reduction; 
• The preparation of guidelines for industry and specific technical codes that address Natech 
risk; 
• The development of methods for Natech risk assessment and the identification of Natech 
scenarios which are to date missing or insufficient; 
• Land-use planning that explicitly addresses Natech risk; 
• Better preparedness and training for the mitigation phase if a Natech accident occurs; 
• The development of best practices for Natech risk reduction.  
 
 
 Improvement of current regulations, codes and/or guidelines 
1 + Guidelines for the consideration of natural hazards in plant design, operation and 
maintenance, hazard analysis, safety documents and emergency plans of operators. 
+ A guideline for the consideration of natural hazards in inspecting establishments 
according to the Seveso-Directive. 
+ Special Technical Codes for the structural engineering of plants containing 
hazardous substances. 
+ Drafting and communication of integrated natural hazard risk maps. 
+ Implementation of a special concept for the risk and crisis communication of natural 
hazards. 
2 + Methods of Natech risk assessment are in the state of development only. 
+ Insufficient Natech evaluation procedure for land use planning.  
+ No special preparedness/training for mitigation in the case of Natechs.  
3 Some weaknesses exist. These include: 
+ Relatively poor perception of Natech risks by staff of industrial facilities. 
+ Lack of good practices for Natech mitigation with approval by the State and 
industry. 
4 Earthquake impact may be underestimated but this a personal assumption. 
5 Even if there are many legal acts for the prevention of and response to emergency 
situations there is no legal act which would clearly address the Natech problem. 
Natech risk is reduced by implementing the wide range of different legal requirements 
which often duplicate or conflict with each other or bring confusion due to different 
titles of the same document. 
6 + There is no uniform approach regarding the risk identification for the chemical 
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operators. 
+ Operators should be supported (through economic policies) to adopt the most 
reliable technical solutions to reduce risk. 
+ Studies evaluating the effects of Natech risk should be developed, which will 
represent the basis for the development of compulsory security measures on-site. 
7 We have no rules for the mitigation and prevention of natural risks other than floods. 
Other very important natural hazards in our country are landslides, wildfires, storms, 
and so on. 
 
Table 4: Gaps in regulations and codes and proposals for improvements. 
 
3.4 Conclusions on regulations for the prevention and mitigation 
of Natech accidents 
 
From the analysis of the questionnaire responses we conclude the following: 
 
1. In 77% of the responding countries natural hazards are addressed either implicitly or 
explicitly in the existing regulations for chemical-accident prevention. In the remaining 23% 
of the cases natural hazards are not addressed in the context of these regulations. 
2.  In 69% of the responding countries technical codes, standards or guidelines for the design, 
construction and operation of buildings and other structures in industry that consider natural 
hazards exist. However, in many cases only selected natural hazards that a country is subject 
to are considered. Moreover, these technical codes, standards and guidelines are designed to 
protect buildings or other structures from natural hazards but may not give appropriate 
consideration to installations housing hazardous substances. 
3. Only 23% of the responding countries have guidelines specific for Natech risk reduction. 
These guidelines address, however, only selected natural hazards in a country. 
4. 75% of the responding countries report that they are developing a strategy to address Natech 
risk. This suggests that Natech risk has been recognised as an emerging risk. It also indicates 
that while a general legislative framework for Natech risk reduction seems to be in place the 
countries acknowledge the need to address the lack of detailed knowledge on Natech risk 
which may have resulted in gaps in Natech accident prevention.  
5. In 42% of the responding countries natural-disaster management rules, codes or guidelines 
restrict hazardous-materials handling in hazard-prone areas. 
6. The effectiveness of regulations in preventing Natechs is considered slightly positive. This 
assessment is partly based on the absence of Natech accidents which may not be adequate as 
an indicator of effectiveness.  
7. It is inconclusive from the survey if current regulations are sufficient to prevent Natech 
accidents. The occurrence of Natechs in some countries indicates that they may not be. 
8. There is a perceived need for improving current regulations and filling existing gaps to fully 
address the Natech risk a country may be subject to. The main proposed improvements are 
according to the survey: the implementation and enforcement of specific regulations for 
Natech risk reduction, the preparation of guidelines for industry and specific technical codes 
that address Natech risk, the development of methods for Natech risk assessment and 
identification of Natech scenarios which are to date missing or insufficient, land-use planning 
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that explicitly addresses Natech risk, better preparedness and training for the mitigation 
phase, as well as the development of best practices for Natech risk reduction.  
 
4 Natech events data collection and retrieval 
 
A typical problem of the analysis of Natech accidents is data unavailability. Therefore we asked 
the questionnaire participants whether their country or organisation maintains a database for 
recording/retrieving information on chemical accidents, and if not whether there was any other 
type of record of these accidents. Of the 13 respondents to this question, 10 indicated to have a 
database for chemical accidents, while 3 keep written records only. With respect to maintaining a 
database specific for Natech accidents all 13 respondents replied in the negative. 
 
Although the big majority of the questionnaire respondents does not maintain a Natech-specific 
accident database, the 11 of them who answered the question indicate that their conventional 
chemical-accident databases or their written accident documentation can be used to identify and 
retrieve information on Natech events. In these databases Natech accidents are recorded as 
normal chemical accidents with a natural triggering event. This may not always allow the 
capturing of the specific characteristics of a Natech accident as opposed to a conventional 
chemical accident. 
4.1 Conclusions on Natech events data collection and retrieval 
 
The conclusions from the responses to this section of the questionnaire are: 
 
1. 77% of the responding countries maintain a database which can be used to record and retrieve 
information on conventional chemical accidents; the rest keep written records. 
2. There are no specific Natech accident databases. 
3. Conventional chemical-accident databases can be used to retrieve Natech accidents. The 
taxonomy needs to be clarified, however, to ascertain that chemical accidents with a natural-
hazard trigger are consistently and reliably classified. 
 
5 Learning from Natech accidents: Case histories 
 
Of 13 total responses, 7 (54%) report that Natech accidents have occurred in the respective 
countries in the period between 1990 and 2009. The remaining 6 respondents (46%) indicate that 
they have not experienced Natech events in the requested time period (Figure 4). It should be 
noted that Natech accidents tend to be underreported and that responses to this survey may reflect 
this tendency.  
 
In the frame of the Natech survey 5 responding countries provided information on a total of 72 
Natech accidents that occurred in their countries. These accidents are included in tabular form in 
Annex E. Releases of hazardous materials were reported in 68 accidents, while in 2 cases only 
structural damage without release occurred and in another 2 cases non-structural damage. One 
near miss was also reported. The analysis of the submitted Natech accidents showed that the most 
frequent causes were lightning, river floods and low temperature, accounting for about 65% of the 
reported cases. Figure 5 shows the natural-event triggers reported for this study. 
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Interestingly, most of the natural hazards that triggered a Natech accident are explicitly or 
implicitly considered in the respective countries’ rules, codes and guidelines for chemical-
accident prevention (Annex B, Table B1). However, often only natural hazards with a severity 
above a defined reference event are taken into account. Moreover, the above rules may be very 
general and usually technical codes, standards or guidelines are used for risk-assessment or lay-
out purposes (Table B2). In fact, in several responding countries Natech accidents were triggered 
by natural hazards that are in principle considered in these codes. However, as discussed in 
Section 3.1 technical codes may not address the specific hazards and secondary risks arising from 
hazardous-substances processing and handling at industrial installations. This is, for instance, 
supported by the high incidence of reported Natech accidents triggered by lightning, a natural 
hazard which is typically addressed in the technical codes and standards for building protection. 
Despite the existence in some countries of dedicated guidance on Natech risk reduction for 
selected natural hazards (Table B3) it has not kept Natech accidents from occurring. Therefore, 
the preparation of guidance informed by lessons learned from past Natech accidents should be 
encouraged.   
 
 
 
Figure 4: Number of Yes/No counts for Question 6. 
 
 
In terms of consequences, atmospheric releases (26), liquid spills (23) and fires (20) were the 
most frequently observed final scenarios, followed by explosions (8) and solid releases (2). 
Quantitative data on on- and off-site consequences was included in 7 Natech events which 
resulted in a total of 2 fatalities and 79 injuries.  
 
Some of the Natech accident descriptions in Annex E include information on the failure mode(s) 
and lessons learned from the accident. The typical observed failure modes with hazardous-
substance releases due to the three most frequently reported Natech triggers were e.g. vapour 
ignition and explosions at floating roof tanks or process upset caused by lightning strikes, failure 
of containment dykes, tank floating with rupture of pipes and connections or overloading of 
drainage capacity in the case of floods, and freezing and bursting of pipes for low temperatures. 
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Figure 5: Natural-event triggers in the Natech accidents reported by the responding countries in 
the frame of this study. 
 
 
The lessons learned and recommendations provided with the reported Natech cases address 
organisational aspects but also technical issues. Examples of technical recommendations for 
preventing the occurrence of a Natech accident induced by freezing are, for instance, choosing the 
appropriate pipe geometry or heating the vulnerable pipe segments. In the case of floods the 
construction of floodwalls or the installation of retention ponds under tanks were indicated as 
measures to prevent or mitigate the consequences of a flood-triggered Natech accident. General 
lessons learned draw attention to the importance of safety during start-up of a plant after having 
been in stand-by mode due to a natural hazard or disaster. The importance of standalone 
emergency lifelines was also highlighted. 
5.1 Conclusions on learning from Natech accidents 
 
The conclusions from this section of the questionnaire are: 
 
1. Chemical accidents triggered by natural hazards and disasters have occurred in 54% of the 
responding countries between 1990 and 2009, making Natech events a relevant source of risk. 
2. The most frequent natural-hazard triggers in the reported accidents are lightning, floods and 
low temperature. 
3. The main final scenarios reported are atmospheric releases, liquid spills and fires. Explosions 
and solid releases occurred to a lesser extent. 
4. Some of the Natech accidents reported in the frame of the survey resulted in fatalities and 
injuries. 
5. Lessons learned from past Natech accidents are often available and should be widely and 
systematically disseminated. 
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6 Natech awareness and risk reduction 
 
In order to assess the level of awareness and knowledge of Natech risk and its reduction we asked 
respondents to answer 10 targeted questions by ranking their answers from 1 (Disagree strongly) 
to 5 (Agree strongly). A ranking of 3 was considered neutral and was interpreted as possibly 
indicating a lack of adequate information to judge the situation. These questions were answered 
by 13 survey participants out of 14. The first question referred to the Natech awareness of the 
survey respondents (Figure 6). The mean value of the 13 replies is 4.5 and therefore quite high, 
indicating that the respondents have heard about the concept of Natechs.  
 
The situation looks different for the question if risk managers and safety professionals in industry 
in the respective countries are aware of the concept of Natechs. The sample mean of the answers 
to this question is 3.1 and indicates an overall neutral opinion. However, 6 respondents (46%) 
believe that there is some level of Natech awareness in industry (Figure 7). Three respondents 
(23%) disagree with this statement. 
 
Overall, there is slight agreement among the respondents that Natech accidents are discussed 
among those in charge of chemical-accident prevention and mitigation in their countries, as 
indicated by a sample mean of 3.6 (Figure 8). In fact, 7 countries (54%) show slight or strong 
agreement with this statement. A mean value of 3.9 and therefore stronger agreement is obtained 
for the answers to the question if Natech events are discussed among those in charge of natural-
disaster management in the respective countries (Figure 9). This accounts for slight to strong 
agreement of 9 responding countries (69%). In our experience this assessment may be optimistic 
as past Natech accidents indicate that authorities and first responders to natural disasters may not 
be adequately prepared for situations where a simultaneous response to a chemical accident is 
required. 
 
 
Figure 6: Ranking of responses to Question 8a of the Natech survey. 
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Figure 7: Ranking of responses to Question 8b. 
 
 
 
Figure 8: Ranking of responses to Question 8c. 
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Figure 9: Ranking of responses to Question 8d. 
 
 
The survey participants expressed a neutral opinion (sample mean = 3) to the question if  there is 
enough emphasis on Natech risk reduction in the laws and regulations for chemical-accident 
prevention and mitigation in their countries, with almost as many respondents disagreeing (39%) 
and agreeing (46%) (Figure 10). There is slight disagreement (39%) to a neutral opinion (39%) 
that there is adequate knowledge on the dynamics on Natechs among the respective country’s 
competent authorities (Figure 11) with a sample mean of 2.9. The existence of adequate training 
in Natech risk reduction of a country’s competent authorities is overall judged neutral to slightly 
positive with a sample mean of 3.2 (Figure 12). Six countries (46%) slightly agree that this 
training is adequate.  
 
Overall, the respondents indicate slight agreement (sample mean 3.4) that current practices for 
chemical-accident prevention and mitigation in the respective countries provide for adequate 
protection of citizens against possible Natech events. Of the 13 replies received, 8 (62%) 
expressed slight agreement (Figure 13). This trend follows the one observed in the previous 
question on the effectiveness of regulations in preventing Natech accidents (Figure 3).  
 
The responses to the question on whether current industry risk assessment methods adequately 
take into consideration Natech events indicate that the survey participants are almost equally 
divided into two groups: those who agree with the statement (54%) and those who disagree with 
it (46%). This is  shown in Figure 14. The observed dichotomy in the replies may be due to 
different practices in the responding countries that put a higher or lower emphasis on Natech risk. 
As a result, however, Natech events seem not to be taken adequately into account in the current 
industrial risk assessment process in 46% of the responding countries. This could have resulted in 
low levels of preparedness for potential Natech accidents. 
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Figure 10: Ranking of responses to Question 8e. 
 
 
Figure 11: Ranking of responses to Question 8f. 
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Figure 12: Ranking of responses to Question 8g. 
 
 
 
Figure 13: Ranking of responses to Question 8h. 
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Figure 14: Ranking of responses to Question 8i. 
 
 
The replies to the question on whether design and construction of buildings and other structures 
in industry according to the adopted building codes in the respective country provide sufficient 
protection against Natech accidents result in a mean value of 3.4 (Figure 15). This suggests a 
positive trend towards agreement with ca. 62% of the respondents indicating that they concur 
with the question’s statement either slightly or strongly. However, as already discussed in Section 
3.1 the primary objective of building codes is to ensure life safety, but not necessarily to prevent 
hazardous-substances releases. It is therefore uncertain if current building codes provide 
protection against Natech accidents. 
 
In Figure 16 the responses to Questions 8a-8j are summarised to allow for an easier comparison 
of the replies that describe the state of awareness and knowledge on Natech risk reduction. The 
subcategories strong and slight (dis)agreement were combined under the categories “Agree” and 
“Disagree”. Overall, the survey participants believe that awareness on Natech risk exists both in 
the chemical-accident prevention and natural-disaster management communities. They are, 
however, uncertain about whether there is enough emphasis on Natech risk reduction in the 
regulations on chemical-accident prevention. Natech awareness in industry is considered 
significantly lower than for competent authorities and almost half of the responding countries feel 
that Natech risk is not adequately taken into account in the industrial risk assessment process. The 
existence of adequate knowledge on the dynamics of Natech accidents among competent 
authorities ranks lowest. These issues point towards a need for better awareness raising and risk 
communication, and the development of specific methodologies and tools for including Natech in 
industrial risk assessment.  
 
 21
 
Figure 15: Ranking of responses to Question 8j. 
 
12
9
8
8
7
7
6
6
6
3
1
3
3
2
4
4
2
4
5
1
2
3
6
2
3
5
3
5
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14
I was aware of the concept of Natech risk (8a)
Natechs are discussed among those in charge of natural-
disaster management (8d)
Current practices for chemical-accident prevention provide
adequate protection against Natech accidents (8h)
Current building codes provide protection against Natech
events (8j)
Current industry risk assessment methods adequately take
into account Natech events (8i)
Natechs are discussed among those in charge of chemical-
accident prevention (8c)
Competent authorities have adequate training on Natech risk
reduction (8g)
There is enough emphasis on Natech risk reduction in
regulations on chemical-accident prevention (8e)
Risk managers/safety professional in industry are aware of
Natech risk (8b)
Competent authorities have adequate knowledge on the
dynamics of Natech accidents (8f)
Replies received
Agree
Neutral
Disagree
 
Figure 16: Summary graph of the responses to Questions 8a-8j of the Natech survey. 
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The survey respondents’ opinion on how susceptible their respective countries are to a natural 
event causing a chemical accident was ranked from 1 (low susceptibility) to 5 (high 
susceptibility) and resulted in a sample mean of 2.8 based on 13 received replies (Figure 17). This 
suggests an overall trend towards moderate perceived susceptibility. In fact, 8 countries (62%) 
indicated a moderate susceptibility to the occurrence of a Natech accident. 
  
 
 
Figure 17: Ranking of responses to Question 9a. 
 
 
We also asked survey participants which type(s) of natural hazard(s) they would in their 
perception be most concerned about with respect to triggering a Natech accident in their 
respective country. In this context we had categorised natural hazards into geological and 
weather-related events with further subcategories for both hazard groups. A detailed break-down 
of the natural-hazard categories of most concern is presented in Figure 18 which is based on 14 
responses. The first 5 natural hazards believed to be of concern for triggering a Natech accidents 
are river floods, storms, followed by heavy rain, flash floods and lightning. The first geological 
hazard of concern is earthquakes which ranks in 7th place together with storm surge, landslides 
and wildfires.  
 
Combining Figures 5 and 18 provides a comparison of the ranking of natural events that have 
caused the Natech accidents reported in the frame of the survey and those that are perceived to be 
of the biggest concern for causing a Natech accident in the respondents’ countries (Figure 19). 
The comparison shows that the perceived risk from lightning and in particular low temperatures 
seem to be underestimated while the risk from high winds and earthquakes is overestimated. 
While caution needs to be exercised in the interpretation of Figure 19 as the spatial distribution of 
natural hazards between countries may not be uniform. The hazards lightning, floods, low 
temperature and high winds are, however, common in all responding countries.  
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Figure 18: Ranking of natural hazards perceived to be of concern for causing a possible Natech 
accident in the survey countries. The numbers indicate how many countries expressed concern 
with respect to a particular natural hazard. Not all hazards can occur or are of equal relevance in 
all the responding countries. 
 
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
Lig
htn
ing
Flo
od
Lo
w 
tem
pe
rat
ure Ra
in
Sto
rm
 (w
ind
)
La
nd
slid
e
He
at
Ea
rth
qu
ak
e
R
an
ki
ng Accident data
Perception
 
 
Figure 19: Ranking of natural-event triggers that caused Natech accidents (frequency of cause) 
and those that are perceived to be of biggest concern for triggering a Natech accident (risk 
perception). 
 
 
The level of satisfaction with the steps taken by a country or organisation to reduce the possibility 
of occurrence of a Natech accident is shown in Figure 20. The analysis was based on 13 
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responses and yielded a sample mean of 3.5 which indicates a tendency towards satisfaction. A 
more detailed analysis showed that 12 countries (92%) expressed moderate to high satisfaction. 
 
 
Figure 20: Ranking of the survey responses to Question 9c. 
 
 
The respondents were asked to explain why they were satisfied with the Natech risk reduction 
steps taken in their countries or organisations, or when their satisfaction was low why not. Eight 
survey participants provided further comments which are shown in Table 5. In general, 
satisfaction was attributed to the existence of legislation or codes and standards, as well as 
natural-hazard maps in some countries. Government incentives as a means to promote 
preventative measures for Natech risk reduction also increased satisfaction. Despite indicating 
some satisfaction with the steps taken to reduce Natech risk, improvements with respect to the 
development of dedicated guidelines and technical standards were suggested. 
 
 
 Why are you or why are you not satisfied with your country’s Natech risk 
reduction steps? 
1 There are chances for further improvement, such as: 
+ Guidelines for the consideration of natural hazards in plant design, operation and 
maintenance, hazard analysis, safety documents and emergency plans of operators. 
+ A guideline for the consideration of natural hazards in inspecting establishments 
according to the Seveso-Directive. 
+ Special Technical Codes for the structural engineering of plants containing 
hazardous substances. 
+ Drafting and communication of integrated natural hazard risk maps. 
+ Implementation of a special concept for the risk and crisis communication of natural 
hazards. 
2 Good knowledge of hazard-related physical processes; appropriate mapping/zoning; 
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relatively efficient warning systems; pretty well-enforced regulation (e.g. land-use 
planning); efficient emergency response. 
3 Mapping of areas exposed to landslides and flooding is performed. Governmental 
subsidy is given to preventive measures in certain areas. 
4 Need for more human and technical resources. 
5 Compliance with Seveso II Directive. 
6 According to the Law on Planned Economic Activity Environment Impact 
Assessment new planned establishments have to take into account possible natural 
hazards. These hazards and their possible consequences can influence the decision of 
permission for such an economic activity. For the existing establishments the 
requirement to prepare plans of civil protection preparedness for an emergency and/or 
internal plans is imposed. The plans should consider natural hazards and foresee 
preventive measures. Also, the actions and coordination with special services in case 
of an emergency should be described in the plans. My country is susceptible to quite a 
narrow range of natural disasters. Nevertheless, there are no legal acts, rules or 
guidelines which clearly address even the existing range of natural hazards and their 
possible impact on industrial plants. 
7 The implementation of the Seveso II Directive required the identification and analysis 
of Natech risk, even at the operator level. The authorities with competences in the 
field of risk prevention and management developed response scenarios. Based on 
existing data, the probabilities of Natech risk occurrence were estimated. 
8 I am quite satisfied with risk mapping, which is now in progress, but I see that our 
country is very slow in this. Our country will be able to publish flood risk maps in 
2013. This year (2010) there were huge floods in our country, highlighting that his 
problem is very important.  
 
Table 5: Reasons for (dis)satisfaction with a country’s measures to reduce Natech risk. 
 
 
Surprisingly many respondents (7 out of 13) indicated that their country had developed Natech 
risk maps for all or parts of its territory (Figure 21). This result was at first surprising as it is our 
experience that true Natech risk maps hardly exist. A closer look at the additional remarks 
provided by the respondents with respect to this question clarified, however, that while many 
countries have natural hazard/risk maps for some natural hazards, hardly any of them have 
specific Natech risk maps (Table 6). Where these Natech risk maps exist they are usually a simple 
overlaying of natural and technological hazard maps. While this gives an indication of possible 
Natech hot spots it may not allow a realistic assessment of the Natech risk. The conclusion from 
this question would therefore have to be that there is a lack of Natech-specific risk maps in the 
responding EU Member States. 
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Figure 21: Number of Yes/No counts for Questions 10-14. 
 
 
 For which natural hazards do you have Natech risk maps? 
1 There are maps on possible impacts by rain, snow, wind, earthquakes, flood plains and 
flood risks on the regional or local level, but there are no special Natech risk maps. 
2 All possible risks can be retrieved from websites, e.g. for flooding. Linking these 
maps to chemical plants however hasn’t been a major element of designing these 
maps; it is more a collection of all kinds of possible risks. 
3 Floodable areas with Seveso installation overlapping. 
Landslide risk maps with Seveso installation overlapping. 
4 Flood risk maps (for coastal and river flooding) are available for the parts of our 
territory. 
5 Only natural risk maps: Hazard mapping for earthquake (PGA; site effects); flooding 
(based on historical observation and/or modeling); subsidence; avalanche; hurricane 
(on-the-spot modeling of hurricane path/expected landing area). 
6 Mapping of areas exposed to flooding and landslides. These maps are, however, not 
specific for chemical installations at risk. 
7 In some cases there are Natech risk maps drawn up by local authorities. Generally 
Natech maps can be produced on request by analysis of the overlapping of Seveso 
plants locations with natural risk areas using geographic information systems 
available to central and local authorities. 
8 Floods (in progress), landslides 
 
Table 6: Natural hazards for which Natech risk maps were specified to exist in the responding 
countries. 
 
 
With respect to the question if specific Natech scenarios had been developed, only 5 countries 
(38%) out of 13 replies answered in the positive, while 8 countries (62%) have no specific Natech 
scenarios (Figure 21). The absence of scenarios could have resulted in a low preparedness level 
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for possible Natech accidents in the majority of the responding countries. A description of the 
reported scenarios is provided in Table 7. 
 
 
 Description of the developed Natech scenarios 
1 Difficult to answer: free scenario construction (What-if-based) seems to be better then 
pre-prepared scenarios. 
2 As part of safety reports, it is compulsory for industrial facilities to: 
+ Identify those accident sequences that are potentially triggered/initiated by natural 
hazards. 
+ Demonstrate an appropriate level of control of those accident risks. 
3 In the Safety Reports Natech events must be included by operators and evaluated by 
competent authorities. For example in an industrial park the competent authorities 
assessed a scenario of an overflow from artificial basin (induced by heavy rain) 
interesting a chemical plant. 
4 An earthquake may cause leakage. 
5 Scenarios can be found in safety reports and emergency plans (eg. ammonia tank 
damage as a result of an earthquake, accidental pollution by flood). 
 
Table 7: Existing specific Natech scenarios reported in the frame of the survey. 
 
 
Natech risk reduction measures appear to be more widespread than specific Natech scenarios in 
the responding countries, with 10 (77%) out of 13 countries indicating that specific measures 
exist in their countries (Figure 21). A description of these measures is given in Table 8. A more 
detailed analysis of the comments in Table 8 suggests that the discussed Natech risk reduction 
measures lie within the frame of the Seveso II Directive on the control of major accident hazards 
involving dangerous substances or other legislation on pollution control. It is, however, not clear 
how detailed these requirements are in addressing Natech risk reduction. The Seveso II Directive, 
for example, requires that external hazards be considered when preparing the safety document. It 
does, however, not provide any guidance on how this should be accomplished, nor does it 
propose any methodologies to be used in this context.  
 
 
 Describe the Natech risk reduction measures in your country/organisation 
1 + Consideration of natural hazards in safety documents and emergency plans of 
operators. 
+ Requirements for installations for handling of substances hazardous to water in 
flood plains. 
+ Consideration of establishments in flood risk maps. 
+ Avoiding sites of establishments in coal mining areas. 
2 Natural disaster response plans of chemical companies and governments. 
3 In the framework of Seveso II fulfillment. 
4 Use of flood warning provision and flood management plans.  
5 + Consideration of natural hazard in operators’ safety report. 
+ Fire forces and other emergency-related organizations are increasingly considering 
Natech situations when designing emergency response or contingency plans: 
- Monitoring, detection and warning dissemination; 
- Number and profile of staff involved; 
- Equipment and procedures; 
- Lessons learned approach. 
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6 + Oil storage sites often describe potential effects of lightning. 
+ Large sites in the southern part of our country describe risks involving winds. 
+ Risks of dam breaking due to heavy rains are considered. 
+ Risks of the spreading of polluted surface water due to flooding are considered 
within areas with polluted ground. 
7 Case by case at local level. 
8 According to the Regulations on Prevention of, Response to and Investigation of 
Industrial Accidents the operator is required to prepare the Safety report. The Safety 
report must contain the information on the possible natural hazards and describe the 
measures which are taken in case of Natech events. Also according to the Law on 
Civil Protection all legal entities are required to prepare plans of civil protection 
preparedness for an emergency. These plans also should consider the possible natural 
hazards. 
9 + Risk analysis contained in the safety reports; accident scenarios analysed in the on-
site plans for Seveso units. 
+ Considering the natural disasters starting with the design phase of the technological 
installations; elaboration and review of security reports; elaboration, verification and 
review of action plans in case of emergencies. 
10 + Short analysis in the prevention of major accidents;  
+ Flood plans for regions and plan to protect the population (under the responsibility 
of civil protection). 
 
Table 8: Natech risk reduction measures in the surveyed countries. 
 
 
With respect to Natech risk reduction measures that could serve as best practice 7 (54%) out of 13 
countries replied positively (Figure 21). The examples that were provided in the frame of the 
survey as best practices are summarised in Table 9. Some of these examples are of a general 
nature, while a few best practices dedicated mainly to flood events are Natech-specific. This 
suggests that while the availability of best practices may currently be limited in some countries or 
restricted to a few natural hazards, some knowledge exists that could be transferred. The 
identification of best practices for Natech risk reduction is a priority area for future work. 
 
 
 Examples of Natech risk reduction measures that could be best practice 
1 For examples see: H.-J. Warm, K.-E. Köppke: Protection of existing and planned 
establishments and installations against hazardous environmental impacts, especially 
flood. UBA-Texte 42/2007; Chapter 4.4.3 and 7 
(http://www.umweltdaten.de/publikationen/fpdf-l/3326.pdf)  
2 These examples are of a more general nature, e.g. when flooding is foreseen train 
carriages with chemicals will be transferred to safer locations. 
3 Environment Agency’s flood mapping and warning system. 
4 + Consideration of natural hazard in operators’ safety report. 
+ Fire forces and other emergency-related organizations are increasingly considering 
Natech situations when designing emergency response or contingency plans: 
- Monitoring, detection and warning dissemination; 
- Number and profile of staff involved; 
- Equipment and procedures; 
- Lessons learned approach. 
5 There is one site with a large amount of hazardous substances on site which is located 
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close to the drinking water supply for a major city. The entire area is known as 
sensitive to landslides. Specific stabilizing measures have been taken to prevent what 
could be very serious scenarios.  Within the licensing process for hazardous 
installations it is very common to give an assignment to the operator to investigate 
possible consequences on the establishment of climate change.  There are some 
additional guidelines on prevention of natural hazards which are not however focused 
on Natechs.  
6 EUROSOT 2005: An emergency response exercise concerning the consequences of a 
major earthquake involving a wide industrial area, was carried out in Eastern Sicily in 
2005 (http://eurosot.protezionecivile.it). 
7 + Risk analysis contained in the safety reports; accident scenarios analysed in the on-
site plans for Seveso units. 
+ Establishment and enforcement of policies to prevent major accidents at facilities 
involving dangerous substances. 
+ Elaboration of security reports, risk analysis and on-site emergency plans. + + 
Drawing up plans for risk analysis and coverage. 
 
Table 9: Natech risk reduction measures that were provided as examples of best practices. 
 
 
About 46% of the respondents (6 out of 13 countries) indicated that there are ongoing research 
activities or projects on Natech risk reduction in their respective countries (Figure 21). This is an 
interesting result as it shows that there is awareness about Natech risk coupled with the realisation 
that there is a lack of knowledge and therefore research is needed for effective Natech risk 
reduction. The Natech research activities and projects, as well as the countries they are performed 
in are listed in Table 10.  
 
 
Country Natech research activity or project 
Czech Republic Project of the Ministry of Environment: SPII 1a10 45/07 “Complex 
interaction between industry and nature events with respect to major 
accidents” – Better understanding of Natechs; the highest priority are 
floods/chemical installations interactions. 
France Selected references: 
+ Ministry of Environment: Program on NaTech risks and technical support 
to competent authorities. 
+ INERIS: Research program on NaTech risk assessment, mitigation and 
lessons learned. 
+ CETE-Méditerranée: Vulnerability reduction of industrial facilities to 
natural hazards. 
Germany K.-E. Köppke et al.: safety arrangements and measures due to hazards by 
precipitation and floods, Umweltbundesamt (ongoing). 
Italy Research activities reported in the scientific literature but not implemented 
in national programmes or systems.  
Netherlands In the framework of the National Safety Strategy research is executed. 
 
Table 10: Information of Natech-specific research activities and projects in some of the survey 
countries. 
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6.1 Conclusions on Natech awareness and risk reduction 
 
Our conclusions from the analysis of this questionnaire section are as follows: 
 
1. Awareness of Natech risk exists among the respondents. 
2. The respondents tend to believe that there exists some degree of Natech awareness in industry 
but less than among competent authorities. 
3. The survey participants indicate that Natechs are discussed among authorities for both 
chemical-accident prevention and natural-disaster management. In our opinion the latter may 
be an optimistic assessment as past Natech accidents indicate that authorities and first 
responders to natural disasters may not be adequately prepared for situations where a 
simultaneous response to a chemical accident is required. 
4. On average the respondents seem to be undecided on whether there is enough emphasis on 
Natech risk in current regulations on the prevention of chemical accidents.  
5. The respondents show a slight tendency to believe that competent authorities do not have 
adequate knowledge on the dynamics of Natech accidents.  
6. The existence of adequate training in Natech risk reduction of a country’s competent 
authorities is overall judged neutral to slightly positive.   
7. There is a slightly positive tendency to believe that current practices for chemical-accident 
prevention sufficiently protect from possible Natech accidents. 
8. In almost half of the responding countries Natech risk seems not to be adequately taken into 
account in industrial risk assessment.  
9. There is a slightly positive tendency to believe that the design and construction of buildings 
and other structures in industry according to buildings codes provides sufficient protection 
against Natech accidents. In addition, the respondents’ moderate to high satisfaction with the 
steps taken in their countries to reduce Natech risk is attributed to the existence of legislation, 
technical codes or natural hazard maps. This overlooks the fact that the objective of codes 
and standards is to achieve life safety but not necessarily prevent secondary hazards, such as 
the possible release of hazardous substances.  
10. The respondents expressed an overall moderate susceptibility of their countries to the 
occurrence of a Natech accident.  
11. The responding EU Member States appear to be mainly concerned with river floods, storms, 
heavy rain and flash floods as potential triggers for Natech accidents. However, the most 
frequent accident triggers in the Natech events provided in the frame of the survey were 
lightning, floods and low temperatures. 
12. There is a lack of specific Natech risk maps in the responding EU Member States. Natural 
hazard/risk maps for selected natural hazards exist in some regions. 
13. There are few Natech-specific scenarios. This means that the preparedness level for possible 
Natech accidents may be low in the majority of the responding countries. 
14. The majority of the respondents (77%) indicate that Natech risk reduction measures exist in 
their countries. These are, however, usually anchored in chemical-accident prevention or 
pollution control regulations which do not provide guidance on how Natech risk reduction 
should be undertaken nor do they recommend methodologies for Natech risk assessment. 
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15. Over half of the responding countries provided examples of Natech risk reduction measures 
that could be considered best practice. These are, however, mainly related to floods.  
16. The threat of Natech accidents has been recognised, as well as the lack of specific data, 
models and tools, and almost half of the responding countries have ongoing or have launched 
research activities into Natech risk reduction. 
 
 
7 Identifying needs and limitations 
 
In order to identify the main reasons that limit a country or organisation from including Natech 
prevention strategies in their planning we asked the survey participants’ opinion on 8 questions 
concerning factors that could influence the implementation of Natech risk reduction measures. 
These questions were answered by 12 survey participants who indicated their views on a 5-level 
scale from 1 (Disagree strongly) to 3 (Neutral) to 5 (Agree strongly).  
 
The first question referred to lack of awareness as limiting factor, and the break-down of the 
individual answers is shown in Figure 22. The majority of respondents (58%) indicate slight or 
strong disagreement that awareness is a limiting factor in Natech risk reduction. This is also 
highlighted by a sample mean of 2.6. A different picture presents itself for the limiting factor lack 
of knowledge (Figure 23) where the respondents who disagree and those who agree are 
distributed in equal number (42%) around the central neutral value.  
 
With respect to a lack of adequately trained personnel as factor influencing Natech risk reduction 
the respondents are equally divided (Figure 24) with an equal number (33%) of countries 
agreeing, disagreeing or expressing a neutral opinion.  
 
Seven countries (58%) indicate slight or strong agreement that the lack of adequate resources 
hampers the inclusion of Natech risk reduction into countries’ and organisations’ planning 
(Figure 25). Three countries (25%) disagree slightly or strongly with this statement, resulting in a 
sample mean of 3.5. A slightly higher overall agreement (sample mean 3.7) is found for budget 
constraints as factor influencing Natech risk reduction as shown in Figure 26. This may be 
indicative of the perception that the costs of considering Natech risk reduction may outweigh the 
gains. 
 
Over 58% of respondents (7 countries) disagree that the implementation of Natech risk reduction 
is adversely influenced by an organisation not feeling responsible for it (sample mean 2.4). The 
exact breakdown of replies is shown in Figure 27. The same number of respondents disagree that 
the problem originates in the fact that the responsibility of an organisation with regard to Natech 
risk reduction may not be defined (Figure 28). A similar trend is observed for liability and/or 
legal issues where 6 respondents (50%) disagree that this factor hampers Natech risk reduction 
(Figure 29). In contrast, 4 countries (33%) indicate slight agreement which points towards 
different practices in the responding EU Member States. 
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Figure 22: Ranking of survey responses to Question 15a. 
 
 
Figure 23: Ranking of survey responses to Question 15b. 
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Figure 24: Ranking of survey responses to Question 15c. 
 
 
Figure 25: Ranking of survey responses to Question 15d. 
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Figure 26: Ranking of survey responses to Question 15e. 
 
 
Figure 27: Ranking of survey responses to Question 15f. 
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Figure 28: Ranking of survey responses to Question 15g. 
 
 
 
Figure 29: Ranking of survey responses to Question 15h. 
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The survey participants’ responses to Questions 15a-h are summarised in Figure 30. The main 
factors limiting the inclusion of Natech risk reduction practices and measures in an organisation’s 
planning appear to be budget constraints or a lack of adequate resources. The factors that 
influence the implementation of Natech risk reduction the least are awareness, responsibility or 
liability issues.  
 
7
7
5
4
4
4
3
2
2
4
2
4
1
2
2
3
3
1
5
4
7
6
7
7
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14
Lack of adequate resources (15d)
Budget constraints (15e)
Lack of knowledge (15b)
Lack of adequately trained personnel (15c)
Responsibility not defined (15g)
Liability and/or legal issues (15h)
Lack of awareness (15a)
Not the organisation's responsibility (15f)
Replies received
Agree
Neutral
Disagree
 
Figure 30: Summary graph of the responses to Questions 15a-h of the Natech survey on the main 
factors hampering the implementation of Natech risk reduction. 
 
 
In the next question we collected the survey participants’ opinion on what they felt was needed to 
guarantee effective Natech risk reduction in their respective country or organisation. To this 
effect the respondents’ view on 5 dedicated suggestions was solicited, and they gave their ranking 
again on a 5-level scale from 1 (Disagree strongly) to 5 (Agree strongly). Overall, 13 countries 
replied to this section of the questionnaire. The first suggestion referred to whether training of 
officials in charge of chemical-accident prevention on Natech risk reduction was needed. Six 
countries (46%) slightly or strongly agreed with this (Figure 31), which is somewhat surprising as 
only 4 respondents (33%) indicated that the lack of adequately trained personnel was a limiting 
factor for Natech risk reduction (Figure 24). A stronger correlation between the two answers 
would have been expected. On the other hand, 5 countries (39%) slightly disagree that training of 
officials in charge of natural-disaster management on Natech risk reduction is needed (Figure 32). 
This indicates a tendency to believe that those dealing on a daily basis with natural-disaster 
management may be better informed about the existence and the dynamics of Natech accidents 
and therefore need less training than those dealing with chemical-accident prevention. This 
perception may be erroneous as it neglects the fact that a Natech event is a chemical accident 
whose trigger is, however, an external rather than an internal event. 
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Figure 31: Ranking of survey responses to Question 16a. 
 
 
Figure 32: Ranking of survey responses to Question 16b. 
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A very clear trend toward strong agreement was observed when analysing the responses to the 
question on whether guidance on Natech risk assessment, prevention and mitigation is needed for 
operators of industrial establishments. Eleven respondents (84%) agreed slightly or strongly with 
this statement (Figure 33). As indicated before, the Seveso Directive, for example, does not offer 
any guidance to industry other than saying that external factors should be considered in the safety 
document. The same tendency was observed for the suggestion that guidance on Natech risk 
assessment at the community level is needed, where 62% of respondents showed slight or strong 
agreement (Figure 34). At the community level, guidance is needed for local emergency 
management to be able to prepare for a simultaneous natural disaster and chemical accident. 
 
The respondents also agree (62%) that Natech risk maps to inform land-use planning decisions 
and emergency planning are needed (Figure 35). 
 
 
Figure 33: Ranking of survey responses to Question 16c. 
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Figure 34: Ranking of survey responses to Question 16d. 
 
 
Figure 35: Ranking of survey responses to Question 16e. 
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Figure 36 gives and overview of the survey responses to Questions 16a-e which indicate the 
priority needs to be addressed to guarantee effective Natech risk reduction. The survey 
participants expressed a clear need for guidance on Natech risk assessment for industry. This is 
closely followed by the need for Natech risk maps and guidance on Natech risk assessment at the 
community level. 
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Figure 36: Summary graph of survey responses to Questions 16a-e. 
 
 
Other issues that the survey participants would like to see addressed to improve Natech risk 
reduction in their respective countries or organisations are summarised in Table 11. In addition to 
the proposed improvements to current regulations discussed also in Section 3.3 and Table 4, the 
respondents mention issues such as research into the impact of climate change on future Natech 
risk, the preparation of integrated natural-hazard maps, the development of emergency-
management plans that consider Natech risk, and the improvement of risk communication on 
natural risk as important.  
 
 
 Which other issues would you like to see addressed to improve Natech risk 
reduction? 
1 + Guidelines for the consideration of natural hazards in plant design, operation and 
maintenance, hazard analysis, safety documents and emergency plans of operators 
and in inspections. 
+ Elaboration of Technical Codes for the structural engineering of plants containing 
hazardous substances. 
+ Consideration of Natech risks in land-use-planning, off site emergency plans and 
disaster management.  
+ Integrated natural hazard risk maps i.e. maps considering all relevant kinds of 
natural hazards and displaying them in the same way. 
+ Improvement of forecast (and “nowcast”) systems for natural hazards e.g. for 
heavy precipitation, flash floods, tornados.  
+ Improvement of risk communication on natural hazards, including warning and 
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alarm systems. 
+ Research on the consequences of climate change on natural hazards e.g. the 
relevance of tornados and wildfires for the safety of establishments. 
2 Some emergency response services - with a focus on fire forces - have expressed an 
interest to understand better complex emergencies such as Natechs, in order to 
prepare for them. 
3 Dedicated personnel. 
 
Table 11: Issues to be addressed to improve Natech risk reduction in the responding countries. 
  
 
With respect to coordination between institutions 13 (93%) respondents out of 14 replied that the 
organisations or agencies in charge of chemical-accident prevention and mitigation work in 
coordination with organisations in charge of natural-disaster management in their countries. In 
addition, the majority of respondents (91% out of a sample of 11 countries which replied to this 
question) believes that there is no overlap of responsibilities between organisations and other 
agencies that would affect the effective planning for and mitigation of Natech accidents in their 
respective countries. The detailed responses to both questions are shown in Figure 37. Some 
countries have commented their answers which lead us to conclude that there may not necessarily 
be a problem of overlapping responsibilities but rather one of a lack of coordination between 
organisations and of co-operation (Table 12). 
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Figure 37: Number of Yes/No counts for Questions 18-20. 
 
 
 Is there an overlap of responsibilities between organisations in your country? 
1 There is no overlap. Cooperation should be improved. 
2 Sometimes the same work is done by other agencies/organizations. Coordination is 
not always optimal. 
3 Integration and/or co-ordination of approaches (risk assessment/mapping; design of 
emergency scenarios; planning of resources etc.) could still be improved at 
community level and/or at risk basin level. 
4 Responsibilities are divided geographically and by extent but not in competence. 
5 The Fire and Rescue Department is a constituent part of the civil protection and 
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rescue system directing the activities of the civil protection and rescue system, 
organising the prevention of emergencies, coordinating the activities of state 
institutions and economic entities in the sphere of civil protection and planning the 
national preparedness for the implementation of civil protection tasks in the event of 
an emergency in time of peace and in wartime. The Fire and Rescue Department is 
also the competent authority for the implementation of Council directive 96/82/EC 
of 9 December 1996 on the control of major-accident hazards involving dangerous 
substances. 
6 These organizations are the same for both areas. 
 
Table 12: Details on a possible overlap of responsibilities between organisations in charge of 
accident and disaster management. 
 
 
With respect to possible gaps in the emergency management of Natechs between organisations or 
agencies in charge of chemical-accident prevention and those in charge of natural-disaster 
management 10 (77%) of the 13 countries responding to this question feel that there are no gaps 
that need addressing (Figure 37). Explaining remarks to the respondents’ answers are summarised 
in Table 13. One respondent pointed out that coordination of approaches could be improved at the 
local/regional level. Other gaps that were highlighted include the lack of pertinent information on 
natural hazards for authorities in charge of chemical-accident prevention, as well as the 
insufficient consideration of natural hazards in safety documents and operator emergency plans. 
Interestingly, one respondent indicated that gaps could result from the fact that natural events 
may not be recognised as possibly important for causing chemical accidents. 
 
 
 Are there gaps in the emergency management of Natechs between government 
agencies that should be addressed? 
1 + No suitable information on natural hazards for authorities in charge for chemical 
accident prevention and operators of installations. 
+ No suitable consideration of risks caused by natural hazards in safety documents 
and emergency plans of operators which have to be supplied to the authorities in 
charge for emergency management. 
2 Fire and Rescue Brigade officers are always members of Seveso II inspection teams, 
so they are well-informed and may directly influence emergency management both 
on- and off-site. For small hazard sources, the situation is more complicated, no 
similar mechanism is present.  
3 Work is being taken forward, as appropriate, by the Competent Authority and the 
civil protection authorities to implement the recommendations of the Incident 
Investigation Board of a recent major accident on ‘emergency preparedness for, 
response to and recovery from incidents’ to ensure robust and fit-for-purpose 
emergency response arrangements across government. 
4 Integration and/or co-ordination of approaches (risk assessment/mapping; design of 
emergency scenarios; planning of resources etc.) could still be improved at 
community level and/or at risk basin level. 
5 Some impact types are not yet seen critically or are not seen linked to chemical 
accidents. 
 
Table 13: Details on possible gaps in the management of Natech accidents between government 
agencies and organisations. 
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The last question in the survey concerned strategies or recommendations to reduce Natech risk. 
We asked the survey participants to share their top three recommendations, which 10 respondents 
provided. This information is shown in Table 14. Several countries indicate that there is a need 
for improved risk communication, as well as for strengthening Natech awareness among industry 
and authorities. Moreover, the improvement or development of natural-hazard and Natech risk 
maps which can be used for land-use and emergency planning was mentioned as a crucial Natech 
risk reduction strategy. A number of countries also feels that specific guidelines for industry on 
Natech risk reduction need to be developed. This requires research and methodological 
development in Natech hazard and risk assessment. Other top Natech risk reduction strategies 
mentioned are the identification of best practices, as well as knowledge transfer, e.g. by the 
dissemination of lessons learned to industry and to the various levels of government (national, 
regional, local). 
 
 
 What are your top three Natech risk reduction strategies or recommendations? 
1 1. Development of guidelines, e.g. for the consideration of natural hazards in plant 
design, operation and maintenance, hazard analysis, safety documents and 
emergency plans of operators and in inspections; 
2. Improvement of risk communication on natural hazards e.g. improvement of risk 
maps, warning and alarm systems; 
3. Research on the consequences of climate change on natural hazards. 
2 1. Development of tools, methods and techniques for evaluation of Natech hazard;  
2. Preparation of a tool kit of best practices for Natech management, including 
experience exchange; 
3. Natech communication campaign targeted to both industrials and responsible 
authorities at all levels. 
3 1. Improve understanding of Natech-specific accident sequences, based on post-
event investigation; 
2. Improve Natech awareness by disseminating lessons learned to industry, 
municipalities and State; 
3. Improve co-operation among the above-listed stakeholders: before, during and 
after Natech events. 
4 1. Strengthen awareness at the local level; 
2. Enhance risk communication policies in general; 
3. Mapping. 
5 1. Mapping of areas exposed to natural hazards; 
2. Control of Land use planning; 
3. Awareness among operators of chemical installations. 
6 1. Framework rules to address all kinds of Natech events; 
2. More funds made available to the competent authorities to improve studies and 
actions; 
3.Guideline documents to operators. 
7 1. Community involvement; 
2. Awareness; 
3. Dedicated personnel. 
8 1. Natech risk maps to inform land-use-planning decisions and emergency planning 
are needed; 
2. Early warning and exchange of information about the coming natural events; 
3. Guidance documents for operators of industrial establishments/installations on 
Natech risk assessment, prevention and mitigation are needed for improved Natech 
risk reduction. 
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9 1. Improving urban development law; 
2. Elaboration of Natech risk and other natural disaster maps; 
3. Developing a BAT guide for prevention Natech risk. 
10 1. Natech risk mapping; 
2. Strict obligations in rules, laws, etc. and monitoring; 
3. Uniform methodologies. 
 
Table 14: Survey respondents’ top recommendations to reduce Natech risk. 
 
7.1 Conclusions on identifying needs and limitations 
 
The conclusions from the replies received for this questionnaire section are: 
 
1. The survey respondents agree that several gaps in Natech risk reduction exist that have to be 
addressed to guarantee effective Natech risk management. 
2. A lack of awareness is not perceived to be a strong limiting factor for Natech risk reduction. 
3. The respondents are divided on whether a lack of knowledge or of adequately trained 
personnel limits Natech risk reduction. 
4. A lack of adequate resources and budget constraints are given as the main factors that could 
limit a country/organisation from addressing Natech risk reduction. This means that there 
seems to be the perception that the costs of considering Natech risk reduction outweigh the 
gains.  
5. Responsibility, liability and/or legal issues are not perceived to be a limiting factor in 
reducing Natech risk. 
6. There is a perceived need for training of chemical-prevention officials on Natech risk 
reduction. Officials in charge of natural-disaster management are believed to be slightly 
better trained on Natech risk reduction. In our experience this perception may, however, be 
erroneous. 
7. There is strong agreement that guidance on Natech risk assessment for industry and at the 
community level is needed. 
8. There is a strong perceived need for Natech risk maps to inform land-use-planning and 
emergency-management decisions. 
9. The survey participants indicate that the following issues should be addressed to reduce 
Natech risk: Elaboration of guidelines on the consideration of Natech risk for operators, as 
well as specific technical codes, natural hazard and Natech risk mapping, improvement of 
risk communication, consideration of Natech risk in land-use planning and offsite emergency 
planning, as well as research into climate change and its impact on future Natech risk. 
10. There is coordination between organisations in charge of chemical-accident prevention and 
those in charge of natural-disaster management. The cooperation and coordination in the 
emergency management of Natechs is mostly well established. 
11. The majority of responses indicate that there is no overlap of responsibilities between 
organisations that could affect Natech risk reduction.  
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12. The top Natech risk reduction strategies are according to the survey: raising awareness at all 
government levels and in industry and improving risk communication, preparing integrated 
risk maps, developing specific guidelines for industry and identifying best practices for 
Natech risk reduction including their dissemination, and developing methodologies and tools 
for Natech risk assessment. 
 
 
8 Conclusions 
 
A study on the status of Natech risk reduction in EU Member States was performed by means of a 
questionnaire survey. The results of the analysis are based on 14 country responses which is too 
small a population size for drawing robust statistical conclusions. As a consequence, the 
quantitative results of this study and their interpretation may be subject to some uncertainty. 
However, a clear tendency towards recognising natural hazards as an important external risk 
source for chemical facilities could be established. In addition, more than half of the responding 
countries declared to have suffered one or more Natech accidents with the release of toxic 
substances, fires and/or explosions and sometimes fatalities and injuries. The natural events that 
triggered these Natech accidents were not necessarily the ones that were believed to be of major 
concern so there is a discrepancy between actual causes and risk perception. 
 
A legal framework for Natech risk reduction exists via the responding countries’ chemical-
accident prevention programmes, but the effectiveness of these programmes in mitigating Natech 
risk is largely inconclusive. The occurrence of Natech accidents indicates that there may be gaps 
in legislation, implementation and/or its monitoring that should be addressed to ensure effective 
Natech risk reduction. In over half the responding countries Natech risk is not addressed in 
natural-disaster management regulations. Existing technical codes and standards for the design, 
construction and operation of buildings and structures in industry consider certain natural hazards 
but their ultimate goal is the safety of human life. Therefore, the prevention of hazardous-
substance releases may not be guaranteed and secondary risks due to these releases may not be 
taken into account. Additionally, some of these technical codes and standards may not be suitable 
for controlling risks due to hazardous substances. Specific guidelines for Natech risk reduction to 
support legislation are scarce. Therefore, the development of specific technical codes and 
guidelines would be required to fully address Natech risk in the EU Member States. 
 
Awareness of Natech risk seems to be increasing within the countries’ competent authorities 
while there is a tendency to believe that the current level of knowledge on the dynamics of 
Natech accidents may not be adequate. Consequently, training on Natech risk reduction is needed. 
There is the perception among the respondents that there is a certain level of Natech awareness in 
industry, although in almost half of the responding countries industry does not appear to 
sufficiently take Natech risk into account in industrial risk assessment. In addition, there is a 
reported lack of Natech-specific scenarios. Low levels of Natech preparedness could therefore 
have resulted. This highlights the need for better risk communication and the development of 
methodologies and tools for including Natech risk into conventional industrial risk assessment. 
Moreover, the development of guidance on Natech risk assessment for industry was indicated as 
the highest-priority need for effective risk reduction, closely followed by the development of 
guidance on Natech risk assessment at the community level.  
 
Natech risk reduction measures seem to be widely available although they are often generic due 
to the absence of data and models on the dynamics of Natech accidents. In fact, currently no 
specific Natech accident databases exist in the responding countries and Natech events have to be 
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retrieved from conventional chemical-accident databases which lack the level of detail to capture 
the specifics on Natech accidents. Moreover, chemical-accident prevention and pollution-control 
regulations, such as the Seveso II Directive, do not provide guidance to the operator on how 
Natech risk reduction should be achieved, nor to the competent authority on how to evaluate that 
the risk level is as low as required by regulations. This is a shortcoming that needs to be 
addressed. Some Natech risk reduction measures that could be considered best practice were 
reported to exist; most provided examples were, however, targeted towards floods. This finding 
suggests that awareness of or the availability of Natech-specific best practices may be limited at 
present and actions should be directed towards filling this gap, e.g. through a concerted effort to 
identify existing best practices and to disseminate them widely. Another priority need expressed 
by the survey respondents is the development of specific Natech risk maps whose availability is 
very limited. These are required for the identification of Natech-prone areas to inform land-use-
planning and emergency-management decisions. In contrast, several countries have developed 
natural hazard or risk maps for selected natural hazards in certain regions.  
 
The results of this Natech questionnaire survey show that the responding countries have largely 
recognised natural hazards and disasters as a relevant source of risk to a chemical facility with the 
potential to trigger a major accident. A framework for Natech risk reduction exists but a strategic 
Natech risk-reduction initiative appears to be lacking. Moreover, the survey highlighted a number 
of shortcomings and gaps that need to be addressed to achieve effective risk reduction. 
Considering the findings of this study the following areas for future work were identified: 
 
• Raising awareness and improving risk communication at all levels of government and in 
industry; 
• The implementation and enforcement of specific regulations for Natech risk reduction; 
• The preparation of specific technical codes and of guidelines for risk assessment in industry 
that address the characteristics of Natech risk; 
• The development of guidance on Natech risk assessment at the community level; 
• The development of methods and tools for Natech risk assessment; 
• The preparation of dedicated Natech emergency management plans which consider the 
characteristics of Natech accidents (e.g. a possible lack of utilities); 
• Identification of best practices for Natech risk reduction and wide dissemination of existing 
practices;  
• The development of Natech risk maps to support effective land-use planning and emergency 
management; 
• Land-use planning that explicitly addresses Natech risk; 
• Training of competent authorities on Natech risk reduction both for officials in charge of 
chemical-accident prevention and those in charge of natural-disaster management; 
• Research into the impact of climate change on future Natech risk. 
 
In order to support the process of improving Natech risk reduction, lessons learned from the 
analysis of past Natech accidents should be formulated and disseminated. These lessons should 
address failure modes and hazardous-substance release paths as a function of natural-hazard 
severity, as well as identify risk-reduction measures and possible best practices. As this requires 
the systematic collection of data on the causes and dynamics of Natech events the JRC has set up 
a specific Natech accident database6 which is public to allow the widest possible access to the 
accident data. Moreover, indicators for measuring the effectiveness and adequacy of Natech risk-
reduction measures should be developed.  
                                                 
6 http://enatech.jrc.ec.europa.eu/ 
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ANNEX A – Government institutions overseeing 
chemical-accident prevention, and rules, codes and 
guidelines for hazardous-substances handling 
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Table A1: List of government institution(s) overseeing chemical-accident prevention and 
mitigation in the participating EU Member States. 
 
Country Which government institution oversees chemical-accident prevention 
and mitigation? 
Austria + Fed. Ministry for Economics (legislation for industrial activities on major 
accidents + mining including enforcement); 
+ Fed. Ministry for Agriculture (legislation for waste activities and water-
related impacts on major accidents); 
+ Fed. Ministry for Interior (coordination for mitigation affecting more than 
one region and transboundary); 
+ Fed. Ministry for Infrastructure (pipeline-related accidents legislation); 
+ Federal Chancellor (political coordination body); 
+ 9 regional administrations (Länder) for regional legislation and 
enforcement, as far as no federal competency is concerned + contact points 
for alarm  + legislative framework for fire brigades; 
+ 84 district authorities (Bezirkshauptmannschaften) for emergency 
response coordination; 
+ 2357 Communities and 15 cities (Statutarstädte) for local emergency 
response and local fire brigade organization. 
Cyprus + Department of Labour Inspection 
+ Civil Defense 
+ Cyprus Fire Service 
+ Department of Town Planning and Housing 
Czech Republic + Competent authority for the prevention of chemical accidents at 
government level is the Ministry of Environment; 
+ Responsible body for disaster preparedness (and prevention in general) is 
the Ministry of Interior; 
+ Several bodies, including county office, environment inspection, fire 
brigade, occupation health and safety, public health service (and in the case 
of explosive mining authority) are involved in inspection of classified 
(Seveso II) installations. 
France + Drafting regulation : Environment Ministry / General department of risks 
preventions/Department for technological risks; 
+ Enforcing regulation / Reviewing and approval of safety documents / 
Licensing hazardous industrial activities : local competent authorities and 
services from Environment ministry (inspectors); 
+ Setting design and building codes or standards : appropriate national and 
international bodies; 
+ Assessing accident risk in Natech-prone facilities: engineering firms; 
consultancy; audit etc.; 
+ Drafting of safety reports for NaTech-prone facilities : experienced 
engineering/consultancy firms. 
Germany + Legislation: 
- Bundesministerium für Umwelt, Naturschutz und Reaktorsicherheit 
(Federal Ministry for Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear 
Safety); 
- Bundesministerium für Arbeit und Soziales. 
+ Enforcement: 
- Umweltministerien der Länder (Ministries for the Environment of the 
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Länder); 
- Ministerium für Arbeit, Gesundheit und Soziales der Länder 
(Ministry of Labour, Health, Social Affairs of the Länder). 
Italy + Central Authorities 
- Ministry of Environment and Land/Sea Protection (MATTM) 
The MATTM carries out the control of Seveso establishments and is 
responsible for the information system and exchanges with the 
European Commission, the other Member States and with international 
organizations. Its main tool is the national inventory of  Seveso 
establishments and related information (position, hazardous substances 
and their quantities, reference persons in the plants, status of 
authorizations, accidents that occurred, etc.). The MATTM also 
coordinates the activities of the other central and local authorities 
regarding the Italian National Digital Mapping Portal. The project 
provides wide access to environmental and geographic data; 
- Ministry of Interior 
It is competent for public security, and operates through Police, 
Prefectures and National and Regional Fire Brigades. It provides 
methodological regulation for the technical activities of the Fire 
brigades; 
- Ministry of Health 
It is competent for public health, and operates through: National Health 
Service, National Institute of Occupational Safety and Prevention 
(ISPESL), and National Institute of Health (ISS). It provides 
methodological regulations for the technical activities of its institutes; 
- Ministry of Infrastructure and Transport 
It is competent for the realization of major civil infrastructures and 
national transport plans. It directs the general choices and provides the 
criteria for land use planning.  
+ Local Authorities 
- Regions 
At the end of the devolution process (art 18 D.Lgs. 334/99 and art. 72 
D.Lgs. 112/98 – so-called “Bassanini law”), they will carry out the 
control of the Seveso establishments, currently carried out by the 
MATT and the CTR. At present, devolution is starting as regards 
environmental issues and in particular industrial risks. The Regions are 
moreover responsible for territory management, and they take part in 
the control procedures of the land use planning, where Seveso 
establishments are located; 
- Municipalities 
For Seveso establishment the Municipality ensures that information on 
safety measures and on the requisite behaviour in the event of an 
accident is supplied to the public (art. 22 D.Lgs. 334/99);  it also 
contributes to land use planning, in agreement with the technical 
conclusions of the CTR, both for the procedures of building 
authorizations and for town planning. 
+ Technical bodies 
- National Fire Brigade (CNVVF) 
Depends on the Ministry of Interior and it has Local Structures of 
Public Emergency Services (Regional Fire Departments and Provincial 
Commands). 
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- Regional Technical Committee - (CTR)  
The CTR is the local technical Authority, at regional level, composed 
of members of the Regional Fire Departments and of other local 
Authorities, such as the Regional Agency for Environmental protection 
(ARPA); it assesses the Safety Report (SR) containing the risk analysis 
elaborated by the operator of Seveso establishment and it assures the 
safety conditions carried out in the establishment by the operator.  
The tools available to the CTR include the technical guidelines from 
the competent Ministries, notably those for fire prevention that also 
indicate specific criteria for the reduction of the potential impacts that 
floods, and other events, can have on the industrial structures. 
- System of Agencies for Environmental Protection (ISPRA/ARPA) 
The system consists of ISPRA-National Institute Of Environmental 
Protection and Research (former APAT), under the control of the 
Ministry of the Environment, which coordinates the Regional Agencies 
(ARPA), under the control of the Regions. The Agencies carry out 
technical-scientific functions concerning environmental protection and 
the prevention of industrial risks. ISPRA does: 
• provide technical support to MATTM;  
• promote and coordinates technical activities of interest for local 
environmental agencies (ARPA), which do their own evaluations for 
the specific problem. 
• contribute to risk evaluation when requested; 
• together with a network including other subjects feed the 
information base of the SINA (Environmental National Informative 
System - Sistema Informativo Nazionale Ambientale). ISPRA is the 
National Focal Point (NFP) for EIONET. 
- National Institute of Occupational Safety and Prevention (ISPESL) 
The ISPESL is a technical-scientific organ of the National Health 
Service, under the authority of the Minister of the Health. 
- National Institute of Health (ISS) 
The National Institute of Health is a technical-scientific organ of the 
National Health Service, which carries out research, experimentation, 
control, advising, and other activities in matters of public health. 
Lithuania The Fire and Rescue Department under the Ministry of Interior of the 
Republic of Lithuania is the competent authority for implementing Council 
directive 96/82/EC of 9 December 1996 on the control of major-accident 
hazards involving dangerous substances. It is also responsible for setting up 
measures to ensure the smooth transfer of public institutions, economic 
entities and  the population from ordinary living (working) conditions to an 
emergency at the smallest losses possible, to the effect that public order is 
preserved, and human lives, property, as well as  the environment is 
protected against emergencies; laying down and publishing civil protection 
methodical recommendations; coordinating the preparation of civil 
protection contingency plans for counties and municipalities; warning and 
informing state institutions, economic entities and population about a 
nationwide disaster that threatens human lives, health, property and 
environment in the event of an emergency; organising localisation of large-
scale emergencies, rescue of people and property as well as response to 
emergencies at national level; carrying out planned and overall check-up of 
the population warning system and its management units; compiling and 
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administering the register of establishments of the state significance and 
dangerous objects;  other. 
Luxemburg + Inspection du Travail et des Mines; 
+ Administration de l’Environnement. 
Netherlands Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment for chemical 
prevention and accidents, while the Ministry of Labour is responsible for 
labour related chemical prevention and accidents. 
Poland In Poland competent authorities for SEVESO II plants are the State Fire 
Service (SFS) and Environmental Protection Inspection (EPI) handling 
responsibilities for both lower and upper tier industrial plants mainly 
focussing on: 
+ assessment and approval of documentation (MAPP’s, safety reports, 
SMS’s and internal emergency rescue plans (only SFS)); 
+ inspections; 
+ preparedness of external emergency plans (only SFS); 
+ establishment of group of Domino effects plants (SFS in collaboration 
with EPI); 
+ land-use planning for SEVESO plants. 
Romania + Ministry of Administration and Interior through the General Inspectorate 
for Emergency Situations  
Responsibilities:  
- Monitors specific risks and their negative consequences;  
- Informs, advises and warns;  
- Plans and prepares resources and services;  
- Neutralizes the effects of hazardous materials;  
- Provides transport of forces and means of intervention, human and 
other resources;  
- Manages decontamination;  
- Coordinates the training for the prevention and reduction of chemical 
accidents at national level  
- Implementing international, European and regional strategies and 
programs for the prevention and reduction of Natech accidents;  
 - Develops research, forecasting and statistical analysis of risk types, 
regarding their nature and frequency, in order to propose measures for 
adequate emergency intervention;  
- Verifies the compliance with the laws and regulations regarding the 
protection against fire and civil protection in the design, 
implementation, operation and usage of constructions, installations and 
facilities;  
- Verifies the activity of detecting potential hazards during construction 
and operation of installations and facilities;  
- Controls the activities that present a danger of major accidents, 
involving dangerous substances;  
- Organizes and develops specific prevention and mitigation measures 
of chemical accidents  
- Participates in the identification, recording and assessing of risk 
factors;  
 - Exercising the coordination, technical guidance and control of 
activities for the emergencies prevention and management;  
- Provides technical assistance on the emergencies management;  
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- Verifies the application of regulations regarding the emergency 
situations management, emergency plans and cooperation plans 
specific for each risk type;  
 - Assures the adequate transmission of decisions, dispositions and 
regulations; 
- Verifies the communication links between the operational centers and 
the dispatching centers involved in the emergency situations 
management;  
- Collects the requests for the resources necessary for the 
implementation of the emergency situations activities;  
- Manages the database related to emergency situations;  
- Executes other duties and tasks in the management of emergency 
situations, provided by law or institutions. 
+ Ministry of Economy  
Responsibilities:  
- Monitors specific risks and their negative consequences  
- Minimizes the consequences of accidents involving hazardous 
substances  
- Provides transport of forces and means of intervention, people and 
other resources  
- Manages decontamination  
- Establishes and assures the implementation of emergency situations 
management and civil protection measures in their domain, as well as 
the implementation of measures for the identification and protection of 
critical national and European infrastructure objectives.  
+ Ministry of Transport  
Responsibilities:  
- Monitors specific risks and their negative consequences 
- It is the regulatory and certification institution in compliance with the 
European Agreement regarding the transport of dangerous goods.  
+ Ministry of Regional Development and Tourism through the State 
Inspectorate in Construction  
Responsibilities: 
- Exerts state control regarding the compliance with the existing 
regulations and laws in the field of land-use and urban planning;  
- Verifies the legality of the building permits, according to the existing 
regulations, within the local public administration departments;  
- Requests the execution of technical experts reports on buildings, 
regardless of their owenrship and destination; 
- Proposes the cessation of building use, after the occurrence of 
technical accidents or natural disasters.  
+ Ministry of Environment and Sustainable Development:  
Responsibilities:  
- Monitor specific risks and their negative consequences;  
- Informs, advises and warns;  
- Neutralizes the consequences of hazardous materials;  
- Manages decontamination;  
- Through the risk secretariat, it elaborates specific procedures in the 
field of risk management and control of activities involving dangerous 
substances;  
- Participates in the environmental impact assessment procedure for all 
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the phases included in the current legislation;  
- Participates in the final decision on approval / rejection of the 
environment certificate;  
- Ensures the implementation of Regulation (EC). 1272-2008 of the 
European Parliament and the EC from 2008 regarding the 
classification, labeling and packaging of substances and mixtures in 
cooperation with the European Agency for chemical substances;  
- Verifies the implementation of measures for accidents prevention and 
consequences reduction;  
- Applies the regulations for the activities involving dangerous 
substances;  
- Verifies the compliance with the regulations in the Environmental 
Permit/Certificate;  
- Controls the activities involving dangerous substances.  
+ ISCIR-State Inspection for the Control of Boilers, under pressure 
Containers and Lifting installations  
- it is an inspection institution for the technical supervision and the 
control in functioning; 
- elaborates technical prescriptions in its field; 
- controls the market in its field. 
Slovakia + Ministry of Environment 
Prevention of chemical accidents, major accidents, labelling of hazardous 
materials etc. Next are the regional departments of environment (all of this 
under prevention) 
+ Ministry of Interior (Reaction in case of an accident) 
Fire prevention and civil protection and their regional departments. 
Sweden + The Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (MSB) is responsible for the 
supervision of the Seveso II Directive at national level as far as 
consequences for the environment and the public are concerned. The 21 
county administrations carry out inspections and enforcement at a regional 
level.  
+ Swedish Work Environment Authority (SWEA) is responsible for the 
supervision of internal aspects of the Seveso II Directive at national level. 
The SWEA’s inspection offices around the country carry out inspections 
and enforcement at a regional level. 
+ Swedish Environmental Protection Agency (SEPA) –the issuing of 
permits for upper tier Seveso establishments is handled under the 
Environmental Code (1998:808). The environmental courts and county 
administrative boards issue the permits. 
+ 21 County Administrative Boards – responsible for inspections according 
to regulations on measures to prevent chemical accidents. 
+ National Board on Housing, Building and Planning is responsible for 
land-use planning issues at national level. 
UK + At Seveso installations: 
- a competent authority comprising the Health and Safety Executive 
(HSE) and the Environment Agency (EA) in England and Wales, and 
HSE and the Scottish Environment Protection Agency (SEPA) in 
Scotland; 
- the Health and Safety Executive Northern Ireland and the Northern 
Ireland Environment Heritage Service; and 
- in each case the environment agencies lead on environmental aspects. 
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+ At IPPC installations: 
- UK environment agencies. 
+ Land-use planning controls are the responsibility of: 
- Communities and Local Government (England); 
- Scottish Government; 
- Welsh Assembly Government; 
- Department of the Environment’s Planning Service (Northern 
Ireland); and 
- Hazardous Substances Authorities (usually Local Authorities) grant 
consent to hold substances at or above specified controlled quantities. 
 
 
Table A2: List of rules, codes or guidelines used to regulate or guide hazardous-
substances production, use or storage in the participating countries. 
 
Country Which rules, codes or guidelines are used to regulate or guide 
hazardous-substances production, use or storage? 
Austria There are about 45 pieces of legislation (laws or ordinances) spread 
amongst some of the institutions listed above that deal basically with the 
transposition of the Seveso-Directive or EIA as far as accident 
prevention/mitigation is concerned. 
Cyprus National legislation in compliance with the Seveso II Directive 
Czech Republic All relevant European directives such as Seveso II, REACH, IPPC, Water 
Framework Directive or EIA are implemented in Czech legislation, as well 
as other agreements and conventions (Stockholm Convention on POPs, 
UNECE Convention on Transboundary Accidents etc.). Czech national 
legislation demands the prevention and preparedness for water accidents 
even for small sources. 
France Selected references: 
+ EC Directives “Seveso” I and II and their transcription into French 
national legislation; 
+ Regulatory background for industrial safety in France: dates back to 18th 
century; 
+ 1976 Law on industrial safety; 2003 Law on Environment; 
+ Subsequent regulation for enforcement of 2003 Law, including NaTech-
specific dispositions. The regulation indicate that external attacks, therefore 
the natural risks, must be treated as initiating events in the safety report 
(also for land use planning and emergency plans); 
+ Sector-specific guidelines of “good practices” (e.g.: petrochemical 
industry); 
+ Hazard-specific guidelines (e.g.: calculation of impact/effect distances for 
BLEVE or Boil-Over). 
Germany + Bundes-Immissionsschutzgesetz (Federal Immission Control Act); 
+ 12. Verordnung zum Bundes-Immissionsschutzgesetz (Störfall-
Verordnung) (12th Ordinance on the Implementation of the Federal 
Immission Control Act (Major Accidents Ordinance – 12. BImSchV);    
+ Technische Regeln Anlagensicherheit und Leitfäden der Kommission für 
Anlagensicherheit (Codes on Process Safety and Guidelines of the 
Commission on Process Safety); 
+ Wasserhaushaltsgesetz (Water Management Act); 
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+ Verordnungen zum Umgang mit wassergefährdenden Stoffen of the 
Länder (ordinances on installations for handling of substances hazardous to 
water of the Länder); 
+ Gesetz über technische Arbeitsmittel und Verbraucherprodukte (Geräte- 
und Produktsicherheitsgesetz – GPSG); 
+ Verordnung über Sicherheit und Gesundheitsschutz bei der Bereitstellung 
von Arbeitsmitteln und deren Benutzung bei der Arbeit, über Sicherheit 
beim Betrieb überwachungsbedürftiger Anlagen und über die Organisation 
des betrieblichen Arbeitsschutzes (Betriebssicherheitsverordnung – 
BetrSichV); 
+ Verordnung zum Schutz vor Gefahrstoffen (Gefahrstoffverordnung - 
GefStoffV); 
+ Gesetz über explosionsgefährliche Stoffe (Sprengstoffgesetz - SprengG); 
+ Zweite Verordnung zum Sprengstoffgesetz (2. SprengV). 
Italy Italy has completely implemented the directives 96/82EC (Seveso II) and 
2003/105/CE (Seveso III) in its regulation, integrating it with the pre-
existent one (SEVESO I). The Italian reference rules are respectively the 
legislative decree august 17, 1999, n. 334 and the legislative decree 
September 21, 2005 n.238 \. 
The Italian implementation calls for the issuing of a series of enforcement 
decrees, fixing criteria and procedures to be followed in fulfilling the 
relevant obligations and in putting into effect the control measures. 
Specifically, the following enforcement decrees are in force, stating: 
- criteria for the drawing up of the Major Accident Prevention Policy 
MAPP and actuation of the Safety Management System SMS (Decree 
of the Ministry of the Environment august 9, 2000); 
- criteria for the identification of the modifications increasing the risk 
(Decree of the Ministry of the Environment august 9, 2000 - not the 
same); 
- link with the procedures for fire prevention (Decree of the Ministry 
of the Environment august 9, 2000); 
- criteria for land-use planning (Decree of the Ministry of the 
Infrastructure may 9, 2001); 
- criteria for the application of the regulation to the industrial ports 
(Decree of the Ministry of the Environment may 16, 2001 n.293); 
- criteria for the drawing up of the Safety Reports (DPCM march 31, 
1989, issued in accordance to Seveso  I but still in force); 
- criteria for analysis and evaluation of safety reports related to LPG 
and flammable liquid storages (respectively Decree of Ministry of 
Environment May 15, 1996 and Decree of Ministry of Environment  
October 20, 1998); 
- criteria for the drawing up of the EEP External Emergency Plans 
(updated criteria to SEVESO II with the new guidelines issued by 
Civil Protection Department - DPCM February 25, 2005). 
 
For the time being, awaiting the near adoption of relevant new decrees on 
the matter, technical guidelines are provided, indicating the criteria for the 
inspections on MAPP and SMS, and a reference document providing 
general criteria for integrated safety studies in the areas with high 
concentration of establishments (in particular, the Syracuse area). 
Lithuania + Law on Chemical Substances and Preparations 
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+ Law on Waste Handling 
+ Law on Safety and Health at Work 
+ Law on Protection of Environment 
+ Law on Civil Protection 
+ Law on Planned Economic Activity Environment Impact Assessment  
+ Law on Supervision of Potential Dangerous Installations  
+ Regulations on Classification and Labeling of Dangerous Substances and 
Preparations   
+ Regulations on Internal Audit of Production and Use of Dangerous 
Substances and Preparations   
Luxemburg + Loi modifiée du 10 juin 1999 relative aux établissements classes;  
+ Règlement grand-ducal du 14 septembre 2000 concernant les études des 
risques et les rapports de sécurité; 
+ Règlement grand-ducal du 23 décembre 2005 modifiant le règlement 
grand-ducal du 17 juillet 2000 concernant la maîtrise des dangers liés aux 
accidents majeurs impliquant des substances dangereuses. 
Netherlands Relevant legislation on external safety: 
+ General 
- Environmental Management Act (Wet Milieubeheer) 
(the most important environmental act); 
- Decree on the external safety of establishments (Bevi) (came into 
effect on 27 October 2004 with the exception of a few aspects); 
- Regulation of the external safety of establishments (Revi) (2004); 
- Fireworks decrees. 
+ Risks of serious accidents 
- Seveso II Directive; 
- Decree on the risks of serious accidents 1999 (BRZO). 
+ Infrastructure investment projects (external safety around roads and 
railways) 
- Circular on risk standards for transport of hazardous materials. 
Poland + SEVESO II Directive implemented in Environmental Protection Act; 
+ Chemical substances and preparations Act; 
+ ADR; 
+ RID; 
+ AND; 
+ Convention on the transboundary effects of industrial accidents; 
+ ATEX Directive implemented into decree of Minister of Economy, 
Labour and Social Policy on minimum requirements for workers working 
with explosive atmospheres; 
+ others. 
Romania + Law no. 31 of 18 May 1994 regarding the Romania's accession to the 
European Agreement on international road transport of dangerous goods 
(ADR), signed at Geneva on 30 September 1957;  
+ Law no. 92 of 18 March 2003 for Romania's accession to the Convention 
on the transboundary effects of industrial accidents, adopted in Helsinki on 
17 March 1992;  
+ Law no. 22 of 22 February 2001 to ratify the Convention on 
environmental impact assessment in transboundary context, adopted at 
Espoo on 25 February 1991;  
+ Law no. 30 of 26 April 1995 to ratify the Convention on the protection 
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and use of transboundary water courses and International Lakes, adopted at 
Helsinki on 17 March 1992;  
+ Law no. 6 of 25 January 1991 for Romania's accession to the Basel 
Convention on the control of transboundary frontiers of hazardous wastes 
and their disposal;  
+ Law no. 14 of 24 February 1995 to ratify the Convention on Cooperation 
for the Protection and Sustainable Use of Danube River (Convention for the 
Protection of Danube River), signed at Sofia on 29 June 1994;  
+ Law no. 98 of 16 September 1992 for ratification of the Convention on 
the Protection of the Black Sea against Pollution, signed in Bucharest on 21 
April 1992;  
+ Government Decision no. 1408 of 4 November 2008 concerning the 
classification, packaging and labeling of dangerous substances;  
+ Government Decision no. 804 of 25 July 2007 on the control of major 
accident hazards involving dangerous substances;  
+ Regulation 1907/2006 - the Registration, Evaluation, Authorization and 
Restriction of Chemicals (REACH), establishing a European Chemicals 
Agency, amending Directive 1999/45 and repealing Regulation (EEC) no. 
793/93 and Council Regulation (EC). 1488/94 of the Commission and 
Council Directive 76/769/EEC and Directives 91/155/EEC, 93/67/EEC, 
93/105/EC and 2000/21/EC of the Commission;  
+ Order of the Minister of Administration and Interior no. 647 of 16 May 
2005 approving the Methodological Norms on developing emergency plans 
in case of accidents involving dangerous substances;  
+ Order of the Minister of Administration and Interior no. 638 of 12 May 
2005 and Minister of Environment and Water Management no. 420 of 11 
May 2005 approving the Regulation on management of emergencies arising 
from floods, dangerous meteorological phenomena, accidents at hydro 
construction and pollution incidents;  
+ Order of the Minister of Economy and Finance no. 1637 in 2007 and 
Minister of Labor, Family and Equal Opportunities No. 391 of 2007 for 
approval of the norm of the intervention and rescue units with industrial 
potential danger of toxic emissions and / or explosive.  
+ HG 642/2005 criteria for the classification of territorial-administrative 
units, public institutions and economic operators in terms of civil 
protection, depending on the specific risks.  
+ Law no. 107/1996 – water law with subsequent additions and 
amendments.  
+ Order no. 1995/1160 of 18 November 2005 approving the Regulation on 
the prevention and management of emergencies specific to earthquakes 
and/or landslides.  
+ HG 642/2005 criteria for the classification of territorial-administrative 
units, public institutions and economic operators in terms of civil 
protection, depending on the specific risks types. 
Slovakia Law nr.163/2001 Z. z. on chemical substances and preparations, Law nr. 
261/2002 Z.z. on prevention of major industrial accidents – implemented 
SEVESO directive, Law nr. 42/1996 on civil protection 
Sweden + Act on measures to prevent and limit the consequences of major chemical 
accidents - Contains necessary definitions, obligations of operators, 
including the construction of a safety report, a management program for 
prevention of major accidents and an internal plan for emergency 
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preparedness. Addresses information to the public and regular inspections 
of establishments covered by the legislation. 
+ Ordinance on measures to prevent and limit the consequences of major 
chemical accidents - Defines for which substances and threshold quantities 
Act (SFS 1999:381) on measures to prevent and limit the consequences of 
major chemical accidents should apply. Contains further details on the 
obligations of operators and on inspections. 
+ Regulations on measures to prevent and limit the consequences of major 
chemical accidents issued from the Swedish Work Environment Authority 
and the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency. 
+ The Civil Protection Act - States the obligation to inform the authorities 
in neighboring countries when an accident has occurred. 
+ The Civil Protection Ordinance - States that local rescue services are 
responsible to prepare an external emergency plan for certain 
establishments covered by Act on measures to prevent and limit the 
consequences of major chemical accidents. States the obligation of 
operators to report on accidents to local authorities and to the Swedish Civil 
Contingencies Agency. 
+ The Environmental Code - Contains regulations on permissions and a 
deepened safety examination during licensing process for upper tier Seveso 
operators. 
+ Ordinance on Environmentally Hazardous Activities and Health 
Protection - Contains regulations on what kind of establishments that need 
permission according to the Environmental code. 
+ Planning and Building Act - Gives the framework for planning and 
building and regulates the planning process.   
UK + Legislation to implement the Seveso Directive – Control of Major 
Accident Hazards Regulations: 
COMAH is supported by a wide range of guidance.  Key documents 
include: 
- A guide to the Control of Major Accident Hazards Regulations; 
- Emergency planning for major accidents; 
- Safety Report Assessment Manual; 
- A range of safety report assessment guides e.g. chemical warehouses. 
+ Legislation to implement IPPC – the Environmental Permitting 
Regulations. 
These are supported by e.g. guidance on containment and accident 
management plans. 
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ANNEX B – Natural hazards in regulations, technical 
codes, standard or guidelines, and Natech-specific risk-
reduction guidelines 
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Table B1: List of rules, codes or guidelines for chemical-accident prevention and 
mitigation that address the natural hazards a country is susceptible to. 
 
Title and year of document Natural hazard(s) 
considered 
Impact on hazardous-
substances handling 
CZECH REPUBLIC   
Conception of Protection of Citizens  (2008) Floods 
Wind 
Storms 
Snowstorms 
Extreme 
temperature 
Indirect 
Crisis plans (continuously) Floods 
Wind 
Storms 
Snowstorms 
Extreme 
temperature 
Indirect 
Act 59/2006 Coll. – Seveso II  (2006) External events in 
general 
Prevention demanded as a 
part of major accident 
prevention. 
FRANCE   
Ministerial order of 10 May 2000 relative to 
the prevention of majors accidents involving 
hazardous substances or preparations present 
in SEVESO installations - Annex IV 
Flooding 
Earthquake 
Climatic events 
In the safety report are not 
considered the following 
natural events : 
+ Earthquakes whose 
intensity is higher than the 
maximum reference 
earthquakes (as defined by 
regulation, see ministerial 
order of May 10, 1993); 
+ Flooding whose 
magnitude is higher than 
the reference flooding 
(defined by the Natural 
Risk Prevention Plans, see 
Question 2); 
+ Climatic events of 
intensity higher than the 
historical events known or 
susceptible to occur that 
may affect the installation. 
Guide for the writing and reading of safety 
reports for upper tier SEVESO 
establishments - Circular of 28 December 
2006 
Earthquake 
Lightning 
Flooding 
Snow 
Winds 
Addresses particular 
initiating events for 
accident risk analysis/case 
of natural hazards: 
+ In the safety report: 
Reference natural events 
considered as initiating 
events in risk analysis, for 
 62
accidental scenarios 
identification / 
Identification of reducing 
risk measures / 
Justification of compliance 
with appropriate 
regulation. 
+ In case of compliance 
with the appropriate 
regulation, it is considered 
that the reducing risk 
approach is sufficient. 
+ Major accidents, caused 
by reference natural 
events, are excluded from 
the land-use planning 
process, and only taken 
into account in emergency 
plans. 
Order of 10 May 1993 laying down the 
paraseismic rules applicable to certain upper 
tier SEVESO industrial installations + 
Circular of 27 May 1994 
 
Note : these regulation will change soon 
(change of the national earthquake map, rules 
of design and construction for industrial 
facilities have been strengthened) 
Earthquake + Determination of the 
“maximum earthquakes 
historically probable” 
(SMHV) with historical 
and geological data. 
+ Definition of “safety 
earthquakes” (SMS) / 
Intensity SMS = intensity 
SMHV + 1 (MSK scale). 
+ Study of the behaviour 
of equipments subject to 
seismic vibrations at least 
equal to those 
corresponding to the 
response spectrum of the 
“safety earthquake” 
(SMS). 
Order of 15 January 2008 the protection 
against lightning of some industrial 
installations (including SEVESO 
installations) + Circular of 24 April 2008 
Lightning + Risk assessment, in 
accordance with NF EN 
62305-2 / Levels of 
protection required for 
installations are defined. 
+ A technical study is 
carried out to define 
precisely preventive 
measures and protective 
devices, their location, and 
the conditions for their 
checking and maintenance. 
GERMANY   
12. Verordnung zum Bundes-Immissions- All (in principle) Natural hazards have to be 
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schutzgesetz (Störfall-Verordnung) 12th  
Ordinance on the Implementation of the 
Federal Immission Control Act (Major 
Accidents Ordinance – 12. BImSchV)    
considered in the layout of 
plants in establishments 
and in safety documents of 
operators. 
Verordnungen zum Umgang mit 
wassergefährdenden Stoffen of the Länder 
(ordinances on installations for handling of 
substances hazardous to water) 
Floods Prohibition of and regula-
tions on installations con-
taining substances haz-
ardous to water in flood 
planes and flood prone ar-
eas. 
Zweite Verordnung zum Sprengstoffgesetz 
(2. SprengV) 
Groundwater, rain, 
floods,  
Installations for storage of 
explosives must prevent 
the intrusion of 
groundwater and rain and 
be safe against impacts by 
floods. 
ITALY   
DPCM March 31, 1989 issued in accordance 
to Seveso I, still in force 
Earthquakes (old 
classification), 
floods, lightning, 
winds, heavy rain, 
sea storms 
 
 
Criteria for analysis and evaluation of safety 
reports related to LPG (Decree of Ministry of 
Environment May 15, 1996) 
Earthquakes (old 
classification), 
lightning 
Criteria for analysis and evaluation of safety 
reports related to flammable liquid storages 
(Decree of Ministry of Environment  October 
20, 1998) 
Earthquakes (old 
classification), 
lightning 
Mandatory Prevention and 
protection counter-
measures carried out by 
the operators which 
involve both 
technical/equipment and 
safety management issues. 
Reports on environmental consequences of 
major accidents 
Factors related to 
seismic hazards 
implementing the 
general criteria of 
the actual seismic 
classification 
Technical reference for 
prevention and protection 
counter-measures carried 
out by the operators which 
involve both 
technical/equipment and 
safety management issues. 
LUXEMBURG   
Use of documents of the surrounding 
countries 
  
POLAND   
Water Act of 18 July 2001 Floods Not in detail. 
Crisis Management Act of 16 April 2007 Natural disasters 
like floods, storms, 
tornadoes, 
earthquakes 
Not in detail. 
National Forest Act 28 September 1991 Forest fires Not in detail. 
Fire Protection Act 24 August 1991 and 
State Fire Service Act of 24 August 1991 
Natural hazards 
like floods, storms, 
Not in detail. 
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fires,  
ROMANIA   
HG 642/2005 - Criteria for the classification 
of territorial-administrative units, public 
institutions and economic operators in terms 
of civil protection, depending on the specific 
types of hazards 
Earthquakes, 
floods, landslides, 
fall of cosmic 
objects, dangerous 
meteorological 
phenomena 
Additional safety measures 
to reduce risks 
Law 107 of 1996 - Water law, with 
subsequent additions 
Floods Prohibiting chemical 
deposits in areas of flood 
risk 
ORDER no. 638/420 of 12.03.2005 of the 
Minister of Administration and Interior and 
the Minister of Environment and Waters to 
approve the Regulation on management of 
emergencies arising from floods, dangerous 
meteorological phenomena, construction 
accidents and pollution incidents 
Floods, dangerous 
weather 
phenomena 
Additional safety measures 
to reduce risks of 
accidental pollution, 
accidents at hydro 
construction, linking 
emergency plans with 
hazard maps 
Order No. 1995/1160 of 18 November 2005 
approving the Regulation on the prevention 
and management of emergencies specific to 
earthquakes and/or landslides 
Earthquakes, 
landslides 
Measures to prevent 
damage or destruction of 
buildings 
SLOVAKIA   
Decree No. 261/2002 Coll. on prevention of 
major industrial accidents 
Floods, storms, 
earthquakes, …. 
(all external 
influences) 
Obligation for operators of 
plants to analyse external 
influences, however, the 
depth of analysis is not 
specified  
SWEDEN   
The Panning and building act  Flooding and 
erosion 
Only land which is suitable 
for the purpose should be 
used for a specific activity. 
This means that land could 
be considered as unsuitable 
for activities involving 
chemicals. 
UK   
A guide to the Control of Major Accident 
Hazards Regulations 1999 (as amended) 
(revised 2006) 
Safety Report Assessment Manual (updated 
2007) 
Consideration of 
external factors 
such as seismic 
evens and extreme 
environmental 
conditions such as 
flooding, wind, 
snow etc. 
Requirement to consider 
relevant external factors in 
the Safety Management 
System. 
Requirement for top tier 
operators to demonstrate 
that risks of a major 
accident initiated or 
escalated by natural events 
are ALARP (as low as 
reasonably practicable). 
IPPC guidance Flooding Guidance on flood risk and 
flood mitigation 
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Table B2: List of specific technical codes, standards or guidelines for the design, 
construction and operation of buildings and other structures in industry that consider 
natural hazards. 
 
Title and year of document Natural hazard(s) considered 
AUSTRIA  
The Eurocodes are transposed into various national 
standards and regional building laws (it is impossible to list 
them all); moreover in older standards natural hazards are 
covered by respective factors as far as avalanches, snow 
load etc. are relevant. 
Earthquake, avalanche, snow load 
CZECH REPUBLIC  
Set of construction rules (several documents), no single 
covering document 
Extreme snowfall, wind, floods, 
lightning etc. 
FRANCE  
PS69 code, updated into PS69/82 and PS92 Earthquake 
EuroCode 8, 1998 (first edition) and later updates Earthquake 
NV 65/99 amended (DTU P 06 002) et N 84/95 amended 
(DTU P 06 006) 
NF EN 1991-1-3 : Eurocode 1 : Actions on structures - Part 
1-3 : General actions – Snow loads (April 2004) 
NF EN 1991-1-4 : Eurocode 1 : Actions on structures - Part 
1-4 : General actions - Wind effects (November 2005) 
Snow and winds 
GERMANY  
Technische Regeln zur Druckbehälterverordnung – 
Druckbehälter, Reihe 600 Aufstellung der Druckbehälter, 
BArbBl. 6/1998, S. 74 
Floods, Groundwater 
Technische Regeln für Dampfkessel Reihe 400 Ausrüstung 
und Aufstellung: TRB 452 Anlagen zur Lagerung von 
druckverflüssigtem Ammoniak für Dampfkesselanlagen - 
Aufstellung, Ausrüstung, Betrieb, Anlage 1, Anlage 2 
BArbBl. 12/1996, S. 67 
Floods, Groundwater 
Technische Regeln für brennbare Flüssigkeiten TRbF 20 
Läger, BArbBl. 6/2002, S. 62 
Floods, Groundwater 
Technische Regeln für brennbare Flüssigkeiten TRbF 40 
Tankstellen, BArbBl. 6/2002, S. 62 
Floods, Groundwater 
Technische Regeln für Acetylenanlagen und Calcium-
carbidlager, BArbBl. 10/1988, S. 44 (45) 
Floods, Groundwater 
Technische Regeln für Gefahrstoffe Reihe 500 
Schutzmaßnahmen bei Tätigkeiten mit Gefahrstoffen, 
TRGS 511 Ammoniumnitrat, BArbBl. 6/2004, S. 43, 
GMBl. Nr. 64 vom 29.12.2008 S. 1338 
„Weather“ e.g. sunlight, floods, 
rain, fog, snow 
Technische Regeln für Gefahrstoffe Reihe 500 
Schutzmaßnahmen bei Tätigkeiten mit Gefahrstoffen TRGS 
514 Lagern sehr giftiger und giftiger Stoffe in 
Verpackungen und ortsbeweglichen Behältern, BArbBl. 
9/1998, S. 53 
Floods 
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Technische Regeln für Gefahrstoffe Reihe 500 
Schutzmaßnahmen bei Tätigkeiten mit Gefahrstoffen TRGS 
555 Betriebsanweisung und Unterweisung nach § 20 
GefStoffV, GMBl. Nr. 14 vom 25.03.2008 S. 287 
Floods 
TRFL Technische Regel für Rohrfernleitungsanlagen, 
BAnz. Nr. 80 vom 28.04.2004 S. 9371 
Mining, Landslides, Groundwater 
DIN EN 1998-4: Eurocode 8: Auslegung von Bauwerken 
gegen Erdbeben - Teil 4: Silos, Tankbauwerke und 
Rohrleitungen; Deutsche Fassung, (Eurocode 8: Design of 
structures for earthquake resistance - Part 4: Silos, tanks and 
pipelines; German version EN 1998-4), 2007-01  
Earthquakes 
DIN EN 1998-6: Eurocode 8: Auslegung von Bauwerken 
gegen Erdbeben - Teil 6: Türme, Maste und Schornsteine; 
Deutsche Fassung EN 1998-6 (Eurocode 8: Design of 
structures for earthquake resistance - Part 6: Towers, masts 
and chimneys; German version EN 1998-6), 2006-03 
Earthquakes 
DIN 4149: Bauten in deutschen Erdbebengebieten - 
Lastannahmen, Bemessung und Ausführung üblicher 
Hochbauten (Buildings in german earthquake areas - Design 
loads, analysis and structural design of buildings), 2005-04 
Earthquakes 
DIN 1055-4: Einwirkungen auf Tragwerke - Teil 4: 
Windlasten (Action on structures - Part 4: Wind loads), 
2005-03 
Wind 
VDI 6004 Blatt 1: Schutz der Technischen Gebäude-
ausrüstung - Hochwasser - Gebäude, Anlagen, Ein-
richtungen (Protection of Building Services - Flood - 
Buildings, installations, equipment), 2006-06 
Floods 
VDI 6004 Blatt 2: Schutz der Technischen Gebäude-
ausrüstung - Blitze und Überspannungen (Protection of 
building services - Lightning protection systems and surge 
protection), 2007-07 
Lightning 
VDI 6200: Standsicherheit von Bauwerken - Regelmäßige 
Überprüfung (Structural safety of buildings - Periodic 
inspections), 2008-10 
Earthquakes, Wind 
ITALY  
Every new construction, industrial plants included, has to 
comply with the New official Technical Rules issued with 
the Decree of Ministry of Infrastructure and Transports 
(January 14, 2008). This Rule is substantially in accordance 
with EC8. The specific topic of equipment and plant are 
treated more in detail  in the UNI codes 
Earthquakes, wind, snow 
LITHUANIA  
Standard LST EN 1991-1-2:2004, LST EN 1991-1-
2:2004/AC:2009 and LST EN 1991-1-2:2004/P:2004  
Eurocode 1: Actions on structures - Part 1-2: General 
actions - Actions on structures exposed to fire* 
Actions on structures exposed to 
fire 
Standard LST EN 1991-1-3:2004 and LST EN 1991-1-
3:2004/AC:2009  
Eurocode 1 - Actions on structures - Part 1-3: General 
actions - Snow loads* 
Snow loads 
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Standard LST EN 1991-1-4:2005 Eurocode 1: Actions on 
structures - Part 1-4: General actions - Wind actions* 
Wind actions 
Standard LST EN 1991-1-5:2004 Eurocode 1: Actions on 
structures - Part 1-5: General actions - Thermal actions* 
 
* International standard together with national annexes is 
followed in Lithuania for design, construction and operation 
of buildings and other structures in industry.   
Thermal actions 
Standard STR 2.01.06:2003 Lightning Safety of 
Constructions’. Proactive Protection from Lightning 
Lightning 
ROMANIA  
Law no. 50 of 29 July 1991 authorizing the execution of 
construction works, with subsequent amendments 
Earthquakes, floods 
Regulation of 25/04/2007 on the prevention of explosions 
for the design, installation, putting into operation, use, 
repairing and maintenance of technical installations 
operating in potentially explosive atmospheres 
Dangerous meteorological 
phenomena 
H.G. 525 of 1996 approving the general urban planning 
Regulation 
All types of natural disasters 
H.G. 925 of 1995 approving the Regulation for the 
verification of technical expertise and quality of projects 
and execution of construction works 
All types of natural disasters 
GT006-97: Guide for the identification and monitoring of 
landslides 
Landslides 
GT019-98: Guide of landslide risks maps for the assurance 
of building stability 
Landslides 
Law no. 10/1995 on quality construction All natural disasters 
SWEDEN  
Regulations on construction from the National Board of 
Housing , Building and Planning 
Buildings should be able to resist a 
certain amount of strain. Natural 
hazards considered are Landslides, 
wind, snow and water. This is not 
specific for industry however.  
 
 
Table B3: List of guidelines specific for Natech risk reduction in the surveyed countries 
for which responses were received. 
 
Title and year of document Natural hazard(s) 
considered 
FRANCE  
Forest fires and industry, ed. DRIRE Provence Alpes Côte d’Azur Forest fires 
Guide for the analysis of vulnerability to flooding for industrial 
companies, Bruno Ledoux Consultants - SAGERIS, 2000 
Flooding 
Flood mitigation for industrial facilities, INERIS, 2004 Flooding 
Vulnerability reduction for flood-prone industry, CETE-Mediterranée, 
2007  
Flooding 
Vulnerability reduction for flood-prone industry, ENSMP-Paris, 2008 Flooding 
Integration of earthquake hazard in risk analysis for industrial accident, Earthquake 
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INERIS, 2006 
Lightning risk, INERIS, 2001 Lightning 
GERMANY  
Leitfaden – Der Lastfall Erdbeben im Anlagenbau (Guideline: The load 
case earthquake in plant engineering) Verband der Chemischen Industrie, 
Frankfurt, März 2009 
Earthquakes 
IKSE - Internationale Kommission zum Schutz der Elbe: Empfehlungen 
für Anforderungen an Anlagen zum Umgang mit wassergefährdenden 
Stoffen in Hochwassergebieten oder einstaugefährdeten Bereichen, Aug. 
2002 
Floods 
ROMANIA  
Territorial risk plan – revised annually All types of natural 
disasters 
Risk coverage and analysis plan – revised annually All types of natural 
disasters 
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ANNEX C – Government institutions overseeing natural-
disaster management, and rules, codes or guidelines 
used 
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Table C1: Government institution(s) overseeing natural-disaster management in the 
participating EU Member States. 
 
Country Which government institution oversees natural-disaster management? 
Austria + 9 regional administrations (Länder);  
+ 84 district authorities (Bezirkshauptmannschaften); 
+ 2357 Communities and 15 cities (Statutarstädte); 
+ Fed. Ministry for Interior;  
+ Federal Chancellor.  
Cyprus The main mission of the Civil Defense Force is the performance of various 
humanitarian tasks intended to protect the civilian population against the 
dangers, and help it to recover from the immediate effects of hostilities or 
disaster as well as to provide the conditions necessary for its survival. 
Czech Republic + Flood warning, extreme weather warning: Czech Hydro-meteorological 
Institute (belongs to Ministry of Environment); 
+ Floods maps, territory in flood risk mapping, including free internet 
access (Ministry of Environment); 
+ Emergency preparedness and civil defense (Ministry of Interior); 
+ Regional (district) offices – Crisis plans. 
France + Natural risks prevention : Environment Ministry 
The policy consists both in improving knowledge ok risks, organizing how 
they are to be monitored, informing the population, enforcing the necessary 
regulations and risks prevention plans, promoting and assisting measures to 
reduce vulnerability, and enabling wider feedback on disasters. 
+ Hazard monitoring and (early warning): 
- (flooding) Central Department for hydro-meteorology and support to 
flood forecasting (SCHAPI), Departments of flood forecasting (SPC), 
Navigation services, Ministry of Equipment.. - Information with flood 
warning national maps; 
- (earthquake) Several geosciences institutions (IRSN) / universities; 
CEA; 
- (hydro-meteorological hazards) Meteo-France. 
+ Emergency response: 
- Ministry of Interior, Civil Protection services; 
- Municipality services; 
- Fire protection services; Police. 
Germany + Legislation and coordination in case of disasters: 
- Bundesministerium des Inneren (Federal Ministry of the Interior); 
- Innenministerien der Länder (Ministries of the Interior of the 
Länder); 
- Regierungen der Länder (district governments). 
+ Disaster Management: 
- Kreise und kreisfreie Städte (counties and cities). 
+ Assistance: 
- Bundesamt für Bevölkerungsschutz und Katastrophenhilfe (Federal 
Office of Civil Protection and Disaster Assistance (BBK); 
- Technisches Hilfswerk (Technical Assistance Organisation (THW). 
Italy The Department of Civil Protection (DCP) 
Under the control of Presidency of the Council the DCP is functional for 
addressing  the activities of central and local authorities, national technical 
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bodies and public and private organizations as far as the Civil Protection 
National System is concerned. In the framework of this system (a star type 
system)  the DCP has competence on promotion and management regarding 
the core set of information needed to risk assessment and prevention from 
disaster . DCP also acts as main director in the coordination of the whole 
activities related to emergency response in case of catastrophic events of 
national relevance including natural disasters. 
Lithuania The Fire and Rescue Department under the Ministry of Interior of the 
Republic of Lithuania oversees natural disaster management. 
Luxemburg Administration des Services de Secours. 
Netherlands Local governments organised in future in safety regions are the first to 
respond to natural disaster management. Based on the scale of the event 
provinces, waterboards or the national government will be involved. 
Poland Crisis management authorities which are under the jurisdiction of local 
governments are responsible for natural disaster management with close 
collaboration with the following institutions mainly: 
+ State Fire Service; 
+ Police; 
+ Inspection of Road Transport; 
+ Building authorities; 
+ Water authorities; 
+ National Forestry; 
+ Institute of Meteorology and Water Management; 
+ NGO’s. 
Romania Since 1 January 2005, in Romania, the National System for Emergency 
Situations Management was organized and functions, in order to assure, in a 
unitary and professional manner, the protection of population’s life and 
health, environment, material and cultural values, during an emergency 
situations, as well as to recover rapidly after an emergency situation. It is 
composed of:  
+ Committees for emergency situations (the national committee, 
ministerial committees and other public institutions committees for 
emergency situations, the Bucharest committee, county committees for 
emergency situations, local committees for emergency situations)  
+ General Inspectorate for Emergency Situations  
- Professional public services in each community for emergency 
situations  
- Operational centers for emergency situations  
- Emergency response commander.  
+ The national committee for emergency situations is formed within the 
Ministry of Administration and Interior and it operates under the immediate 
administration of the minister and of the Prime Minister, having the 
following main attributions:  
- considers and proposes for adoption by the National Government, the 
national insurance plan which includes human material and financial 
resources, necessary for the emergency situations management, 
analyzes and submits for approval to the Government, the Framework 
for the organization, operation and endowment of the committees, 
centers and operational centers for operational situations emergency, as 
well as the decision-making information flow;  
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- declares, with approval of the Prime Minister, the state of alert at 
national level or at several counties level, coordinates the management 
of emergency situations and declares the cessation of the state of alert; 
- decides, with the approval of the Prime Minister, the implementation 
of evacuation plans, proposed by the ministerial, county or Bucharest 
Municipality committees;  
- proposes to the Government, through the Minister of Administration 
and Interior, the establishment of the state of emergency in the affected 
areas by the Romanian President, based on requests received from the 
county or Bucharest committees, and follows the measures established 
for this purpose;  
- proposes to the Government the request / provision of international 
humanitarian assistance in case of emergency situations with 
significant impact, based on the analysis elaborated by the General 
Inspectorate;  
- coordinates, at national level, the activity of the international work 
force required for managing emergency situations, especially in 
reducing the disasters negative consequences;  
- proposes to the Government to include in the annual state budget 
funds necessary to manage emergency situations, including the funds 
necessary for operational structures of the National System to intervene 
outside state borders, in the specialized structures of international 
bodies with responsibilities in the field;  
- establishes the main support functions provided by the ministries, 
other central agencies and nongovernmental organizations on 
emergencies prevention and management, which is then approved by 
the Government;  
- initiates the elaboration of legislation regarding the emergency 
situations management and advise on those developed by the 
Ministerial, county and Bucharest Municipality committees;  
- establishes cooperation of the National System structures with other 
National authorities and other bodies of the Romanian state or 
international authorities in the management of emergency situations 
and it coordinates public information on the management of 
emergencies;  
+ Committees for emergency situations have been established and 
function within ministries and public institutions, having the following main 
attributions:  
- inform the National Committee through the General Inspectorate on 
the potential generating emergency situations and their imminent 
threat;  
- develop regulations on the emergency situations management, 
specific to each risk types in the field of the ministries and other public 
institutions with responsibilities in the management of emergency 
situations and presents them for approval to the General Inspectorate 
and the National Committee;  
- evaluate emergency situations in the fields of competence, establish 
specific measures for their management, including the pre-alarming of 
the emergency services in the field of competence of the ministries, 
and propose, if necessary, the declaration of the state of alert;  
- consider and approve their plans for providing human, materials and 
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financial resources necessary for the emergencies management;  
- inform the National Committee.  
+ General Inspectorate for Emergency Situations  
It is a specialized body of central public administration, with juridical 
personality, within the Ministry of Administration and Interior, which 
ensures, at national level, the implementation in an unitary manner of the 
current legislation regarding human life, human health and environment 
protection against fires and disasters and the implementation of civil 
protection and emergency situations management measures.  
It functions as national contact point in the relations with the government 
and international organizations and NGOs with responsibilities in 
emergency situations management and ensures the coordination and control 
of specialized professional and voluntary services for emergency situations 
management.  
It has the following main attributes:  
- Analyzes, evaluates and monitors the risk types, forecasts on their 
evolution in order to identify potential generating conditions for 
emergency situations and also proposes measures to warn the 
population and reduce the negative consequences. It provides:  
* Coordination of unitary enforcement throughout the country of 
the measures and actions for prevention and management of 
emergencies;  
* Operative informing of the Minister of Administration and 
Interior and the institutions concerned on the potential generating 
emergency situations or occurrence of emergency situations in the 
territory, through their own information system;  
* inform the population through the media on the imminent threat 
or emergency situations and on the measures taken to reduce the 
consequences;  
* technical and expert coordination of operational centers and 
ensures the maintenance of a permanent information flow.  
It coordinates:  
* the national training programs for protection against disasters;  
* the activities of prevention and intervention performed by the 
professional community services and the formation of groups 
which will coordinate the operational response in case of 
emergency situations in the affected areas;  
* the planning of resources necessary for the management of 
emergency situations at national level and the development of plan 
which will ensure human, material and financial resources for such 
situations;  
It endorses:  
* and proposes to the National Committee for approval the plans of 
intervention, cooperation or technical assistance elaborated in 
cooperation with other international organizations, in order to 
improve the emergencies management;  
* the regulations on emergency situations management, developed 
by ministerial committees.  
- Cooperates with the international institutes in the field, on the basis of 
the conventions in which Romania is party, and verifies the compliance 
with these conventions during emergency situations;  
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- Provides technical assistance to the public central and local 
authorities regarding the management of emergencies;  
- Manages the database on emergency situations and provides data and 
information required for managing emergency situations to interested 
institutions;  
- Proposes the participation with means and forces to reducing the 
consequences of emergency situations outside the country, according 
to treaties, agreements and international agreements to which Romania 
is party to the Administration and Interior Minister;  
- Cooperates with other agencies in managing the emergency situation. 
+ Public professional services for emergency situations  
These are individual structures which function as county inspectorates and 
Bucharest Municipality inspectorate, providing coordination, guidance and 
control activities in order to prevent and manage emergency situations.  
They are organized on territorial administrative units and accomplish the 
following tasks.  
- Organize and perform specific activities to prevent emergency 
situations;  
- Participate in the identification, recording and evaluation of risk 
factors and elaborate risk schemes for their territorial unit, which are 
approved by the prefect;  
- Coordinate, guide and control the emergencies prevention and 
management activities;  
- Provide technical assistance on the management of emergencies;  
- Monitor through the operational centers the evolution of emergency 
situations;  
- Plan, organize and develop training for response in case of 
emergencies;  
- Verify the application of regulations on emergency situations 
management, intervention and cooperation plans;  
- Collect resource requirements required to perform support functions 
during emergency situations. 
+ Operational Centers  
Operational centers for emergency situations are competent structures for 
emergency situations management, which, according to the current 
legislation, are part of the National System of Emergency Situations 
Management. At the level of ministries and central public institutions, 
central operational centers are organized, with temporary or permanent 
activity, depending on their duties in managing emergencies.  
Operational centers with permanent structures are operational and technical 
structures, which are formed within ministries and central public 
institutions. They have responsibilities and complex capacities in 
emergency situations prevention and management, in order to monitor, 
assess, alarm and coordinate the interventions in case of emergency 
situations.   
Operational centers with temporary activity are technical – administrative 
structures which fulfill specific duties during the alert state, in case of 
emergency situations and during exercise and trainings for response 
preparedness.  
+ Emergency response commander  
During emergency situations, the unitary coordination on-site of all the 
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actions of the intervention units is executed by a person authorized by the 
National, ministry, county or Bucharest Municipality committee, depending 
on the event nature, severity and on the size of the involved units. This 
person is called the emergency response commander. 
Citizens may request the intervention units from the professional public 
services to perform the below mentioned missions:  
- Fire extinguishing  
- Extrication activities  
- First-aid   
- Save or protect people, goods and animals at risk  
- Reducing the consequences of accidents, natural disasters and 
calamities  
- Transport water to the population affected by disasters;  
- Evacuation of water from the basements of buildings or wells after 
floods; 
- Reducing, collecting or removal of polluting products;  
- Saving from high altitudes;  
- Deactivation of unexploded ammunition 
Slovakia + Ministry of Environment and regional departments (prevention) 
+ Ministry of Interior and Ministry of Defense an their regional 
departments; Fire brigades, Integrated Safety System and Civil Protection 
and the Military (mitigation) 
Sweden Sweden has created and maintains a national platform for the management 
of natural hazards in compliance with the UN Hyogo Framework for Action 
for disaster risk reduction 2005-2015 (HFA). This platform includes a 
network of agencies which meets 5 times a year to discuss and implement 
the action programme. Working groups are formed to carry out the tasks. 
The steering group for the activities is comprised of the Director General 
for each of the agencies in the network.  
+ National Land Survey of Sweden - Field studies and techniques to 
produce analog and digital maps that can be used as the basis for emergency 
planning, preparedness, response and recovery.  Responsible for 
coordinating implementation of the EU INSPIRE directive. 
+ National Railroad of Sweden - Maintains the good conditions of roads, 
recommends routes for safe transport of dangerous goods. 
+ Swedish Water Power Authority - Hydroelectric power regulation and 
dam safety. 
+ Swedish Environmental Protection Agency -Perform climate studies and 
research and propose environmental policy. Much attention is paid to 
climate adaptation, risks and vulnerability.   
+ Swedish Forest Agency – Forestry management. 
+ Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency - Humanitarian 
assistance to countries afflicted by natural catastrophes, capacity building 
projects- Rules and advice related to where businesses and other activities 
in the municipality should be located, building and city planning advice 
where natural hazards exist. 
+ Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (MSB) Support for flood inundation 
maps and landslide risk maps for developed areas.  Support to 
municipalities at the national, regional and local level. 
+ National Board of Health and Welfare – Supervision and guidance for 
schools hospital, day care centres, health care centres. 
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+ National Board of Housing, Planning and Building – Authority for 
planning, land management, water resources urban development and 
building.  Authority monitors the function of the legislative system and 
proposes regulatory changes if necessary.   
+ National Food Administration - Assure that there is drinking water 
available for all even during and after a natural disaster. VAKA group for 
drinking water shortages.  SAMVA is a co-operation between actors to 
insure good water quality and water availability to homes, industry, 
businesses etc. 
+ Swedish Association of Local Authorities and Regions – Ask as a voice 
for all the Swedish municipalities on various issues including natural 
disaster management. 
+ Swedish Geotechnical Institute - Technical Field investigations and 
modeling for slope stability maps in developed areas. Support to 
municipalities that need to produce landslide risk maps. Risk for erosion has 
also become a concern. General erosion risk maps. 
+ Swedish Geological Survey - Provide information including digital maps 
for geological types, soil types and ground water.  
+ Swedish Meteorological and Hydrological Institute - provides services 
such as general forecast and weather warnings, industry specific services, 
simulations and analysis, statistics, climate studies and contracted research.  
Warnings are issued to the public and authorities regarding extreme weather 
(rainfall, storm, avalanche risk). A warning system for fires and vegetation 
fire risk has been operation since about 2000.     
+ Swedish Road Administration - planning building and maintaining state 
roads. Responsible for road transport systems, including impacts on the 
environment, traffic safety, transport quality, and effective regional 
development. 
+ Representatives for the County Administrative Boards – assistance to 
municipalities for risk and vulnerability analysis.  Lead emergency 
operations when it exceeds the capacity of the municipalities. 
UK A number of government instructions have oversight: 
+ in England, the Civil Contingencies Secretariat of the Cabinet Office 
provides guidance on disaster management; 
+ in Scotland, the Scottish Government’s Civil Contingencies Division has 
overall responsibility for civil protection; 
+ in Wales,  the Welsh Assembly Government or Wales office (depending 
on the subject matter) is represented on key committees and fora within the 
UK government relating to civil protection; and 
+ in Northern Ireland, the Central Emergency Planning Unit in the Office of 
the First Minister and the Deputy First Minister promotes and coordinates 
civil protection arrangements. 
HSE also has a role in planning for emergencies where it is the Lead 
Government Department for planning issues relating to civil contingency 
events involving an industrial site – especially a major hazard chemical, 
biological or radiological/nuclear site – regardless of whether the event is 
precipitated by natural disaster. 
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Table C2: Rules, codes and guidelines that address natural-disaster management in the 
participating countries. 
 
Country Which rules, codes and/or guidelines that address natural-disaster 
management are used? 
Austria Not aware of any guidelines etc. that deal with natural-disaster management 
in connection with chemical accidents – if they exist, this would be on 
regional basis. 
Czech Republic + Crisis planning at all levels include as an important part natural disasters 
management; 
+ Bilateral agreement with all neighboring countries (and many others) 
exist, as well as multilateral agreement on mutual help in the case of 
disaster; 
+ UNECE Convention on the Transboundary Effects of Industrial 
Accidents; 
+ UNECE Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary 
Watercourses and International Lakes. 
France + National earthquake map (decree of 14 May 1991), updated in 2009; 
+ Law of 2 February 2005, creation of the Natural Risk Prevention Plans 
(NRPP); 
+ Law on Domestic Safety and Protection of Citizen, 18 March 2003; 
+ Civil Protection Law, 13 August 2004; 
+ Directive 2007/60/CE on the assessment and management of flood risk, 
23 October 2007. 
Germany + Zivilschutzgesetz des Bundes (Federal civil protection act); 
+ Brand-, Katastrophenschutz- oder Zivilschutzgesetze der Länder ((fire- or 
disaster management or civil protection legislation of the Länder). 
Italy As far as the emergency response and natural disaster management the Law 
by Decree 24 February 1992, n. 225 and its amendments is the reference 
code stating the institution of Civil Protection National System under the 
coordination of DCP. 
Many other rules and ordinances regarding the organization of emergency 
activities, funds distribution to local authorities, natural disaster prevention, 
as well as the “upgrading” of DCP organisational structure itself have been 
issued and updated. In the framework of Natech the most important could 
be considered: 
- Law 183 of 1989 and Law by Decree 180 of 1998 on soil defence 
(now included with amendments in the Code of environment, Law by 
Decree  April 3th, 2006 n.152). These measures are designed to 
achieve advanced knowledge of the land through the mapping of areas 
at different levels of risk and danger caused by landslides, avalanches 
and  floods, and provide measures to limit land use. The measures also 
identify main protection actions to  reduce or to remove the risk. 
Actions are identified by Basin Authorities by means the elaboration of 
dedicated sections (PAI and PFSS) of a more general plans (Basin 
Plans) and are mandatory for public or private infrastructure located 
inside risk areas. In some local context (e.g. Po river Authority) 
specific directives are mandatory for the owners of Seveso Plants 
located inside flood areas in assessing hydraulic risk. 
- Decree of Ministry of Infrastructure and Transports (January 14, 
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2008). This Rule states that every new construction, industrial plants 
included, has to comply in design and construction criteria with the 
New official Technical Rules. The rules take into account seismic 
hazards calculated on equally spaced points grid on the national 
territory according to studies carried out by INGV (Substantially  in 
accordance with EC8) 
- OPCM (20/03/2003) states general (administrative) criteria for new 
seismic classification of national territory subsequently implemented in 
the above mentioned 2008 technical rules. The application rule of this 
code (Decree  October 21, 2003 GU n.252 del 29/10/03) identifies in 
its appendix list B those structures whose collapse may generate severe 
impacts on the environment in the event of an earthquake. “Seveso” 
plants, clearly mentioned in list B are identified as priority features for 
which an assessment of seismic adequacy has to be started. 
Lithuania + Law on Civil Protection 
+ Regulations on Emergency Situations Prevention in Lithuania Republic 
+ Regulations on Invokement of Material Resources and General and 
Special Units in the Cases of Emergency Situations and on  Compensation 
Pay for Invokement of Material Resources and General and Special Units 
and on Rendering the State Assistance for the Incurred Damage and Losses  
+ Order No. 1-415 on Setting the Level for Operational Management of the 
Fire Prevention and Rescue Service Forces, Performance of Operational 
Management and Instruction for the Preparation of the Plan for Saturation 
of the Fire Prevention and Rescue Service Forces to Respond to Emergency 
Situations, Emergency Incidents and Accidents, issued by the Director of 
Fire and Rescue Department on 29 December 2008 
+ Also Lithuania has signed governmental bilateral agreements on 
cooperation and mutual assistance in case of emergencies and major 
accidents prevention with Latvia, Poland, Belarus, Germany, Sweden, 
Hungary, and Ukraine.  
Luxemburg Use of documents of UNECE. 
Netherlands Relevant legislation on external safety: 
+ General: 
- Environmental Management Act (Wet Milieubeheer) 
(the most important environmental act); 
- Decree on the external safety of establishments (Bevi) (came into 
effect on 27 October 2004 with the exception of a few aspects); 
- Regulation of the external safety of establishments (Revi) (2004); 
- Fireworks decrees. 
+ Risks of serious accidents: 
- Seveso II Directive; 
- Decree on the risks of serious accidents 1999 (BRZO). 
+ Infrastructure investment projects (external safety around roads and 
railways) 
- Circular on risk standards for transport of hazardous materials. 
Poland + SEVESO II Directive implemented in Environmental Protection Act; 
+ Chemical substances and preparations Act; 
+ ADR; 
+ RID; 
+ AND; 
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+ Convention on the transboundary effects of industrial accidents; 
+ ATEX Directive implemented into decree of Minister of Economy, 
Labour and Social Policy on minimum requirements for workers working 
with explosive atmospheres. 
Romania +  Government Emergency Ordinance  no. 21 of 2004 on the National 
System of Emergency Situations Management; 
+ Law no. 481/2004 on civil protection;   
+ OMAI 1184 of 2006 for approving the Norms for the organization of 
evacuation activities during emergency situations;  
+ Norms of 08.07.2004 on the development of protection plans in the event 
of a disaster caused by earthquakes and/or landslides;  
+ H.G. 2288 of 2004 for the approval of the allocation of support functions 
assured by the ministries, other central agencies and nongovernmental 
organizations on prevention and emergencies management;   
+ O.M.A.I. no. 638/420 of 12 May 2005, approving the Regulation on 
management of emergency situations generated by floods, dangerous 
meteorological phenomena, construction accidents and pollution accidents;  
+ O.M.A.I. 1475/13 October 2006 approving the Regulation on 
management of emergencies generated by forest fires;  
+ Order No. 1995/1160 of 18 November 2005 approving the Regulation on 
the prevention and management of emergencies generated by earthquakes 
and/or landslides.  
Slovakia Law 7/2010 on protection against floods – implemented directive 
2007/60/ES, Law nr. 42/1996 on civil protection, law nr. 364/ 2004 on 
waters – “water law” 
Sweden + Guidelines: 
UN Hyogo Framework for Action for Disaster Risk Reduction 2005-2015.   
+ International agreements: 
Sweden has agreements with Finland, Denmark and Norway, Estonia, 
Latvia and Lithuania for assistance with cross- border disasters, and in some 
cases mutual training activities.  
+ Legislation: 
The Civil Protection Act of Sweden requires that municipalities develop 
programs for emergency prevention and emergency response.  The 
municipalities are legally bound to perform risk and vulnerability analysis.  
+ EU instruments: 
European Community Mechanism enables countries afflicted with a natural 
disaster to receive support from EU Member States.  
UK The Civil Contingencies Act 2004 provides a single regulatory framework 
for civil protection in the UK.  It is supported by statutory guidance on 
emergency preparedness and by non-statutory guidance on emergency 
response and recovery.   There are concordats between the UK Government 
and Scottish Ministers and the Welsh Assembly Government. 
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ANNEX D – Rules, codes and guidelines for natural-
disaster management that restrict hazardous-
substances handling 
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Table D1: List of rules, codes or guidelines for natural-disaster management that directly 
or indirectly restrict hazardous-substances processing, storage or use in areas subject to 
natural hazards. 
  
Title and year of document Natural 
hazard(s) 
considered 
Impact on hazardous-
substances handling 
FRANCE   
The Natural Risks Prevention Plans define rules 
(prohibitions, restrictions) applicable for all the 
constructions, including hazardous industrial 
facilities, located in the different areas exposed to 
natural hazard. 
  
General guide, Natural Risks Prevention Plan / 
Environment Ministry, 1997 
All 
Methodological guide, Prevention Plan for 
coastal risk / Environment Ministry, 1997 
Coastal risks 
Methodological guide, Prevention Plan for 
flooding / Environment Ministry, 1999 
Flooding 
Prevention Plan for flooding / Prevention 
measures / Environment Ministry, 2002 
Flooding 
Methodological guide, Prevention Plan for 
landslide / Environment Ministry, 1999 
Landslide 
Methodological guide, Prevention Plan for 
seismic risk / Environment Ministry, 2002 
Earthquake 
Methodological guide, Prevention Plan for forest 
fires / Environment Ministry, 2002 
Forest fires 
Selection of measures 
based on local context. 
ITALY   
OPCM (20/03/2003) Earthquakes In this rule, for 
constructions where the 
consequences of a 
collapse could be 
relevant, it is mandatory 
for the owners to assess 
seismic adequacy to the 
new classification. 
Decree of Ministry of Infrastructure and 
Transports (January 14, 2008) 
Earthquakes, 
wind, snow 
 
Law 183 of 1989 and Law by Decree 180 of 
1998 and amendments (now Law by Decree 
n.152 of 2006) 
Floods, 
landslides 
In some local context 
River Basin Authorities 
identifies risk areas and 
issue directives that 
provide specific 
measures to verify flood 
risk for Seveso Plants 
ROMANIA   
Order of the Minister of Administration and 
Interior no. 638 of 12. May 2005 and Minister of 
Environment and Water Management no. 420 of 
11 May 2005 approving the Regulation on 
Floods Additional measures for 
safety to ponds 
containing dangerous 
substances 
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management of emergencies arising from floods, 
dangerous meteorological phenomena, accidents 
at hydro construction and pollution incidents 
Order of MTCT / May 1995 (2005) / 1160 (2006) Earthquake For buildings housing 
hazardous substances the 
development and 
implementation of 
measures to 
eliminate/reduce risk is 
required 
SLOVAKIA   
Decree No. 7/2010 Coll. on protection against 
floods 
Floods The obligation of 
operators in flood areas 
to realize mitigation 
against the flood (flood 
plans etc.); 
Plan for developing 
flood risk maps  
Decree No. 364/2004 Coll. on waters – “water 
law” 
Floods  
UK   
Planning Policy Statement 25: Development and 
Flood Risk (published December 2006 by the 
Department for Communities and Local 
Government) 
Flooding Requires an objection to 
new installations 
requiring hazardous 
substances consent (and 
other highly vulnerable 
activities) within flood 
plains. 
If activity is to be 
considered for areas with 
a medium risk of 
flooding then an 
‘Exception Test’, 
including a flood risk 
assessment is required.  
PPS 25 also provides 
guidance on the flood 
risk assessment process 
for new activities. 
Management of Flood Risks at Major 
Installations  
Policy Number: 105_02 (Published 29/05/02 by 
the Environment Agency) 
Flooding Details the Environment 
Agency’s approach to 
proposed developments 
of major installations 
within floodplains and 
the method of 
assessment of existing 
activities i.e. Safety 
Report Assessment. 
 
 83
ANNEX E – List of Natech accidents provided by the 
survey participants 
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SUBSTANCE RELEASED 
 
DATE LOCATION TYPE OF 
INDUSTRY 
TYPE OF 
NATURAL 
HAZARD/ 
DISASTER  
(e.g. flood, 
earthquake)  
TYPE OF 
RELEASE 
(e.g., air 
release, 
liquid spill, 
fire, 
explosion, 
etc.) 
Name 
(e.g., chlorine) 
Quantity 
released  
FAILURE MODE 
 
LESSONS 
LEARNED 
2006 Kolin, 
Czech 
Republic 
Cyanide 
production 
Low 
temperature 
Liquid spill Cyanide 6-9 tons Failure of passive 
mitigation systems: 
containment dikes, 
enclosure 
Importance of 
safety in stand-by 
regime and risk 
analysis 
completeness. 
2002 Neratovice, 
Czech 
Republic 
Chemical 
industry 
Flood  Atmospheric 
release; 
Liquid spill 
Chlorine  86 ton Rupture of pipes 
and connections 
Possibility of 
floods exceeding 
100-yr flood level. 
2002 Ostrava, 
Czech 
Republic 
Aniline 
production 
Low 
(oscillating) 
temperature 
below 
freezing 
point 
Explosion   Run-away reaction Importance of 
safety in stand-by 
regime. 
 
1997 Ostrava, 
Czech 
Republic 
Oil refinery Flood Liquid spill Used oil  Failure of passive 
mitigation systems: 
containment dikes, 
enclosure 
Risk of chemical 
release from 
brownfields. 
 
November 
2008 
Andrezieux-
Boutheron, 
France 
Road transport Flood Liquid spill Used engine oil Unknown 
(1ha 
polluted 
land) 
Flooding of tank 
storing used engine 
oil 
 
November 
2008 
Saint-
Germain 
Chemicals Flood Liquid spill   Impact includes the 
loss of 
Commissioning of 
hydraulic study for 
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Laprade, 
France 
explosimeter in 
buildings 
impacted area. 
 
November 
2008 
Grasse, 
France 
Agroindustry Lightning Fire   Fire of methane 
production unit 
Audit of lightning 
protection system. 
October 
2008 
Missirac, 
France 
Urban water 
treatment plant 
Lightning Liquid spill PCB  Leak of power 
transformer 
 
July 2008 Joncels, 
France 
Railway Lightning Liquid spill PCB  Leak of power 
transformer 
 
July 2008 Colmar, 
France 
Gas pipeline Lightning Fire   Leak of pipeline  
June 2008 Arette, 
France 
Agriculture Flood Liquid spill LPG  Flotation of LPG 
tank 
 
May 2008 Raon-
l’Etape, 
France 
Paper mill Flood Liquid spill   Breach of 
protecting 
floodwall 
• Reconstruction 
of floodwall; 
• Levee watch 
procedure. 
November 
2007 
Le Francois, 
France 
Alcohol 
production 
Earthquake Non-
structural 
damage  
  M7.3 earthquake 
caused anchor 
breach at tanks 
 
July 2007 Mardyck, 
France 
Petrochemical Lightning Toxic cloud Ethylene  Loss of utility 
(torch) 
 
June 2007 Vervins, 
France 
Agriculture Lightning Liquid spill PCB 357 kg Leak of power 
transformer 
 
October 
2004 
Toulouse, 
France 
Battery 
recycling 
Lightning Fire   Fire of piles of 
used batteries 
Updating of 
lightning safety 
report. 
July 2004 Saint-
Sulpice, 
France 
Printing Lightning Gas   Loss of utility 
(emission cleaning) 
Updating of 
lightning safety 
report. 
January 
2004 
Auzouer-en-
Tourraine, 
France 
Chemicals Flood Liquid spill Acrylic 
substances 
 Flooding of site 
occurred during 
cleaning of reactors 
used for mixing of 
• Hydraulic 
study; 
• Improvement 
of safety 
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chemicals measures and 
emergency 
management 
procedures. 
December 
2003 
Arles, 
France 
Phytosan Flood Liquid spill Phytosan 
substances 
 Flooding of 
equipment and 
stocks, despite 
early measures 
taken before the 
flood 
Flooding is 
included as 
additional accident 
scenario in the 
safety report of the 
facility. 
December 
2003 
Saint-Gilles, 
France 
Agropharmace
utical 
Flood Liquid spill Agropharma 
substances 
 No major pollution 
thanks to early 
measures taken by 
staff before the 
flood 
N.a. (Flooding 
already considered 
as potential 
accident scenario 
in existing safety 
report of the 
facility). 
October 
2003 
Romans sur 
Isere, 
France 
Metal industry Lightning Fire Magnesium; H2  Fire of unknown 
mix of industrial 
waste 
Revision of 
storage equipment 
and procedures. 
May 2003 Carsix, 
France 
General store Lightning Fire; 
Liquid spill 
 
River 
pollution 
from polluted  
fire-fighting 
water 
    
October 
2000 
Tarnos, 
France 
Steel recycling Storm Smoke   Strong winds 
prevent fire 
extinguishing 
Revised list of 
accident scenarios 
and management. 
May 2000 Petit-
Couronne, 
Refinery Storm Smoke SO2  Loss of utilities 
(electricity) 
Updated list of 
failure modes. 
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France 
December 
1999 
Muret, 
France 
Chemicals Storm Fire   Loss of electricity; 
loss of internal 
venting capacity 
 
December 
1999 
Ambes, 
France 
Oil storage Storm-rain Liquid spill Petrochemicals  Overload of 
draining capacity 
Cleaning and 
improvement of 
draining systems. 
December 
1999 
Ambes, 
France 
Alcohol 
production 
Storm-rain Liquid spill Sulfuric acid; 
Chlorohydric 
acid 
 Floating of acid 
tanks and spill 
Installation of 
retention ponds 
under acid tanks. 
December 
1999 
Ambes, 
France 
LPG storage Storm-rain Non-
structural 
damage 
  Loss of electricity Power supply by 
emergency 
generator (diesel 
engine). 
December 
1999 
Ambes, 
France 
Soda chlorate 
production 
Storm-rain Liquid spill NaCl  Flooding of facility Building of 
floodwall for local 
protection. 
January 
1997 
Valdoie, 
France 
Metal industry Landslide Liquid spill Petrochemicals  Freeze-triggered 
landslide causing 
pipe breach 
Revised mapping 
of landslide 
hazards/ 
geotechnics. 
January 
1996 
Le Croisic, 
France 
 Storm-rain Liquid spill Engine oil  Flooding of engine 
oil tank 
 
8 August 
2008 
Solingen, 
Germany 
Metal industry, 
Electroplating 
Rain Air release 
 
7 inj. onsite; 
13 inj. offsite 
Nitrous gases 
(NO, NO2) 
20kg Chemical reaction 
of rainwater with 
acid stored in a 
trough in the open. 
• Internal 
prevention 
planning; 
• Worker 
training. 
More details in 
ZEMA: 
http://www.infosis.
bam.de/ 
1 March Duisburg, Iron and steel Wind Structural   A crane was caught More details in 
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2008 Germany works, port 
handling 
damage 
 
1 injured 
by a gust of wind 
and toppled onto 
slack silos under 
construction. 
ZEMA: 
http://www.infosis.
bam.de/ 
13 May 
2006 
Baunatal, 
Germany 
Metal industry, 
Foundry 
Rain, 
lightning 
Explosion;  
Fire 
  A probable lighting 
strike caused 
magnesium scrap 
metal to burn. 
Heavy rain flooded 
the scrap yard with 
up to 20cm of 
water. Reaction of 
the burning Mg 
with the rainwater 
led to the formation 
of hydrogen with 
subsequent violent 
gas explosions. 
• New safety 
concept for 
scrap yards; 
• Evaluation of 
the rain-water 
drainage 
system; 
• Separate and 
roofed storage 
of Mg dross. 
More details in 
ZEMA: 
http://www.infosis.
bam.de/ 
2006 Germany Storage of 
liquefied gases 
Flood Air release Liquefied gas  Floating of un-
anchored tank due 
to flooding and 
subsequent 
breaking of pipe 
connections. 
Re-evaluate flood-
prone areas in the 
face of climate 
change. 
More details in 
ZEMA: 
http://www.infosis.
bam.de/ 
28 February 
2003 
Kaiserslau-
tern, 
Germany 
Storage, 
(un)loading of 
substances and 
preparations 
Low 
temperature 
Air release 
 
2 injured 
onsite 
Chlorine 50 litres Freezing and 
bursting of a feed 
line that went 
unnoticed. After 
thawing of the line 
the liquid entered a 
mixing vessel 
Rinse feed line and 
mixing vessel with 
water before 
putting them out of 
operation.  
More details in 
ZEMA: 
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through the man-
hole lid where it 
reacted with the 
mixture and 
generated chlorine 
gas.  
http://www.infosis.
bam.de/ 
5 January 
2002 
Wismar/Haf-
feld, 
Germany 
Plastics and 
synthetic fibres 
manufacturing 
Low 
temperatures 
Explosion Pentane 16.2 kg Weather-related 
conditions (freeze) 
caused problems at 
automatic start-up 
of vessel filling and 
necessitated 
manual start-up. 
During this period 
another fault 
occurred with a 
gate valve but was 
resolved. Shortly 
after this an 
explosion occurred 
when a 
pentane/nitrogen 
mixture from two 
leaking hand valves 
reacted with 
oxygen. 
 
It is unclear if the 
freeze caused or 
contributed to the 
accident. 
More details in 
ZEMA: 
http://www.infosis.
bam.de/ 
4 January 
2002 
Spreetal, 
Germany 
Waste disposal Low 
temperature 
Air release Nitrogen gas 
mixture 
700 m3 Tearing open of 3 
welded seams on 
Ascertain 
functional 
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containing 
benzene 
the roof of a tank 
containing tar oil 
mixed with solid 
materials. A 
technical failure is 
suspected as 
primary cause but 
the freezing of the 
pressure-control 
valve could have 
caused or 
contributed to the 
accident. 
reliability of 
pressure-control 
valves at low 
temperatures. 
More details in 
ZEMA: 
http://www.infosis.
bam.de/ 
31 
December 
2001 
Laichingen, 
Germany 
Storage, 
(un)loading of 
substances and 
preparations 
Low 
temperature 
Air release; 
Fire 
 
1 fatality 
onsite 
Oxygen 2,400kg Release of oxygen 
into surroundings 
through an 
incompletely 
closed flush valve. 
The valve was 
operated with 
compressed air and 
probably failed due 
to the freezing of 
the compressor 
bleed air pipe. 
• Monitoring of 
the  flush 
valve final 
position; 
• Compressor 
bleed air pipe 
cross section 
lay-out 
changed to 
prevent 
freezing.  
More details in 
ZEMA: 
http://www.infosis.
bam.de/ 
16 June 
2001 
Mannheim, 
Germany 
Storage, 
(un)loading of 
substances and 
preparations 
Lightning Air release; 
Fire 
Naphtha 3,371 kg Lightning struck a 
42,000m3 storage 
tank and ignited 
product vapor 
along the perimeter 
Implement 
measures to 
prevent accidents 
after a lightning 
strike or to 
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seal of the floating 
roof. The fire 
spread over a total 
length of 40m 
along the perimeter 
seal. 
mitigate their 
consequences. 
More details in 
ZEMA: 
http://www.infosis.
bam.de/ 
22 January 
2000 
Rostock, 
Germany 
Storage, 
(un)loading of 
substances and 
preparations 
Low 
temperature 
Air release Ammonia 700 kg In a pressurized 
ammonia storage 
tank depot 
ammonia was 
released from a 
hand valve. Due to 
the low 
temperatures ice 
had formed inside 
the hand valve and 
pushed on the 
bellows, thereby 
destroying it. 
• Inclusion of 
the event into 
the site’s valve 
maintenance 
planning; 
• Replacement 
of the failed 
armature with 
one of 
different 
design. 
More details in 
ZEMA: 
http://www.infosis.
bam.de/ 
13 
November 
1998 
Leverkusen, 
Germany 
Chemical 
manufacturing 
Low 
temperature 
Air release Phophortrichlo
ride 
12 kg Condensation of 
chlorine gas in a 
pipe bridge due to 
low temperature 
and low demand. 
This liquid chlorine 
was carried along 
with the chlorine 
gas into the 
phosphorus furnace 
where it evaporated 
abruptly. 
Installation of a 
safeguard to stop 
chlorine feed if 
necessary.  
More details in 
ZEMA: 
http://www.infosis.
bam.de/ 
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24 October 
1998 
Rostock, 
Germany 
Storage, 
(un)loading of 
substances and 
preparations; 
Ammonia 
storage 
Storm 
(depression); 
Wind 
Air release Ammonia 1,400kg Due to a short 
circuit there was 
limited electrical 
capacity in the 
facility to ensure 
maintaining tank 
pressure using 
compressors. The 
available capacity 
was exceeded when 
a passing 
depression required 
the operation of 
additional 
compressors. This 
resulted in a black 
out.  The torch was 
blown out by the 
high winds. 
• Additional 
heating of 
29kV switch 
unit; 
• Standalone 
emergency 
power supply 
for torch and 
the pressure-
control 
instrumentatio
n; 
• Revision of 
pressure relief 
valves. 
More details in 
ZEMA: 
http://www.infosis.
bam.de/ 
22 February 
1996 
Bitterfeld, 
Germany 
Phosphorus 
mud pit 
Low 
temperature 
Fire 
 
Phosphorus 
(white, 
yellow); 
Phosphorus 
pentoxide gas 
from fire 
 At a former 
phosphorus 
production site 
phosphorus waste 
was stored in pits 
covered with water. 
Due to freeze-up 
this water had been 
frozen. Strong 
sunlight and 
temporary thawing 
led to a reduction 
of the water layer, 
allowing 
More details in 
ZEMA: 
http://www.infosis.
bam.de/ 
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phosphorus to 
reach the surface in 
an area of max. 40 
x 40m where it 
ignited. 
29 January 
1996 
Leuna, 
Germany 
Acetylen 
production 
Low 
temperature 
Explosion Acetylen 0.5 kg Low temperatures 
led to the formation 
of ice on the 
surface of lime 
slurry which fell 
and damaged the 
agitator in a lime 
slurry vessel.  
• Ensure better 
aeration of the 
system; 
• Addition of 
heating to 
prevent 
freezing and 
the formation 
of ice. 
More details in 
ZEMA: 
http://www.infosis.
bam.de/ 
27 
December 
1995 
Rostock, 
Germany 
Storage, 
(un)loading of 
substances and 
preparations; 
Atmospheric 
storage 
 Air release Ammonia 800 kg Ammonia was 
released from a 
safety valve whose 
membrane had 
suffered weather-
related cracking 
and degradation, 
thereby losing its 
tightness. 
• Replacement 
of safety-valve 
membranes; 
• Revision time 
reduced by 6 
months. 
More details in 
ZEMA: 
http://www.infosis.
bam.de/ 
4 August 
1995 
Frankfurt/ 
Main, 
Germany 
Chemical 
processing 
Heat Fire Nitrogen 
oxides (NO, 
NO2); 
 
p-Nitrosophe-
 
 
 
 
20,000 kg 
Self ignition of p-
Nitrosophenol 
stored outside due 
to a heat wave. 
Storage of p-
Nitrosophenol in 
the basement to 
ensure that 
temperatures stay 
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nol below 30 degrees. 
More details in 
ZEMA: 
http://www.infosis.
bam.de/ 
27 
November 
1994 
Germany Acrylic acid 
storage 
Low 
temperature 
Explosion; 
Fire 
 
1 fat. onsite 
12 inj. onsite 
Acrylic acid 10 tons A black-out in the 
facility caused the 
failing of the heater 
fans and the tank’s 
circulating pump. 
The building 
cooled down and 
acrylic acid froze 
in the pipes. The 
acrylic acid started 
to polymerize and 
was transferred into 
the storage tank 
where the 
polymerization 
reaction continued 
unnoticed for 4 
days. Then the tank 
burst due to the 
overpressure 
generated by the 
reaction, the acrylic 
acid exploded and 
ignited a fire. 
• Ensure high 
enough 
temperature in 
storage and 
pipe area that 
acrylic acid 
cannot freeze 
and loose the 
oxygen 
required for 
inhibition; 
• Fit tanks with 
adequate 
pressure-relief 
systems; 
• Monitor flow 
rates in the 
circulating 
loop.  
More details in 
ZEMA: 
http://www.infosis.
bam.de/ 
7 September 
1994 
Bad Breisig, 
Germany 
Plastics and 
synthetic fibres 
Lightning Fire Toluylendiiso-
cynate 
(TDI) 
 Electrostatic charge 
in connection with 
a lighting strike. 
Inclusion of 
scenario in safety 
document. 
More details in 
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ZEMA: 
http://www.infosis.
bam.de/ 
3 August 
1994 
Weilburg/ 
Lahn, 
Germany 
Paint 
manufacture 
Heat Air release Hexamethylen-
1,6-diisocya-
nate (HMDI) 
20 kg Exothermic 
reaction of HMDI 
mixed with 
sawdust for 
disposal due to 
heat. 
Revision of 
operating 
instructions. 
More details in 
ZEMA: 
http://www.infosis.
bam.de/ 
27 June 
1994 
Gernsheim, 
Germany 
Storage, 
(un)loading of 
substances and 
preparations; 
Methanol 
storage 
Lightning Fire; 
Explosion 
Methanol 8,000 kg Lightning struck a 
354,000kg 
methanol tank, 
leading to an 
explosion with fire. 
More details in 
ZEMA: 
http://www.infosis.
bam.de/ 
4 March 
1993 
Ludwigsha-
fen, 
Germany 
Storage, 
(un)loading of 
substances and 
preparations; 
Storage of 
liquefied gases 
Low 
temperature 
Air release 
 
1 injured 
onsite 
1,3- Butadiene; 
 
Flammable 
gases 
 Low temperatures 
resulted in ice 
formation and 
blocking of the 
pipe between the 
sphere and the 
torch which was 
recognized during 
hydrotesting by 
opening the blank 
flange on the pipe. 
When closing the 
flange an ice layer 
formed between the 
seal faces, thereby 
creating an opening 
from where the 
• Avoid 
hydrotesting 
during the 
winter months; 
• Additional 
instrumentatio
n to better 
localize 
blocked pipe 
sections. 
More details in 
ZEMA: 
http://www.infosis.
bam.de/ 
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substance was 
released once the 
pipe was unfrozen. 
6 January 
1993 
Ludwigsha- 
fen, 
Germany 
Chemical 
manufacturing 
Low 
temperature 
Air release 1,3-Butadiene; 
Benzene 
400 kg 
mixture 
A seal failed in a 
flange connection 
in a steam cracker 
due to ice 
formation. 
Better monitoring 
and heating of 
pipes. 
More details in 
ZEMA: 
http://www.infosis.
bam.de/ 
30 June 
1992 
Vogelsang, 
Germany 
Disposal of 
explosive 
substances 
High winds Fire Explosive 
substances 
 During the 
controlled disposal 
of propellants by 
burning, sudden 
high winds caused 
a conflagration that 
got out of control 
and burned 
surrounding 
vegetation. 
Adapt the amount 
of material to be 
disposed of by 
burning to the 
weather 
conditions. 
More details in 
ZEMA: 
http://www.infosis.
bam.de/ 
7 June 1989 Oberhausen, 
Germany 
Chemical 
manufacturing 
Lightning Air release Nitrogen 
dioxide 
31 kg Lightning strike 
caused process 
upset which led to 
the shutdown of the 
nitric acid plant. 
During restart 
incomplete 
decompression 
resulted in a 
release. 
Use check valves 
to avoid 
unintentional 
backflow of gases. 
More details in 
ZEMA: 
http://www.infosis.
bam.de/ 
18 January 
1985 
Wesseling, 
Germany 
Chemical 
manufacturing 
Low 
temperature 
Explosion; 
Fire; 
Air release 
Hydrocarbon 
(gas); 
 
500-11,500 
kg 
 
Bursting of a pipe 
due to freeze-up 
which led to 
Prevent freezing 
by selected pipe 
geometry or use 
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43 injured 
onsite 
Propylene 
 
4,100 kg propylene release 
which exploded. 
heating. 
More details in 
ZEMA: 
http://www.infosis.
bam.de/ 
26 
September 
2007 
Porto 
Marghera, 
Italy 
Polymers Heavy rain Structural 
damage  
  Overbalancing of 
floating roof in 
tank containing 
virgin naphtha 
 
12 October 
2002 
Brindisi, 
Italy 
Petrochemical Heavy rain Liquid spill Fuel oil 1,500 kg Overfilling of basin 
containing rain 
water with oil 
 
22 
September 
2002 
Cogoleto, 
Italy 
Chemicals Flood Solid release Chrome salts  Warehouse flooded  
24 July 2002 Porto 
Marghera, 
Italy 
Polymers Lightning Fire Ethylbenzene  Vapour ignition 
caused by lightning 
 
25 January 
2001 
Rome, 
Italy 
Transport 
pipeline 
Landslide Near miss   Landslide brushed 
against natural gas 
pipeline  
 
14 July 1998 Genoa, 
Italy 
Transport 
pipeline 
Rain Air release Methane  Catastrophic 
rupture of pipe 
 
20 June 
1998 
Cuneo, 
Italy 
Storage Storm Liquid spill Gasoline  Catastrophic 
rupture of tank 
 
23 January 
1996 
Naples, 
Italy 
Pipeline Landslide Air release Methane  Catastrophic 
rupture of pipe 
 
1 November 
1995 
Genoa, 
Italy 
Pipeline Landslide Liquid spill Heavy oil 190 m3 Structural failure of 
underground 
pipeline due to 
electrolytic 
corrosion caused 
by the scratching of 
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the pipe tube by the 
space holders 
between the 
pipeline protective 
packing and the 
pipe. The space 
holders were 
crushed when the 
pipeline packing 
was squeezed onto 
the pipe tube due to 
subsidence of the 
terrain.   
6 November 
1994 
Cuneo, 
Italy 
Pharmaceutical Flood Solid release Toxic materials  River overflowed, 
warehouse flooded 
 
14 
September 
1994 
Turin, 
Italy 
Transport 
pipeline 
Lightning Air release; 
Fire 
Methane  Failure of 
underground 
pipeline 
 
8 October 
1993 
Livorno, 
Italy 
Chemicals Flood Air release Chlorine  Plant flooded  
16 
November 
1992 
Genoa, 
Italy 
Transport 
pipeline 
Landslide Liquid spill Heavy oil 30,000 kg Pipeline rupture  
9 June 1992 L’Aquila, 
Italy 
Storage Flood Air release LPG 40,000 kg Storage flooded  
14 July 1991 Verona, 
Italy 
Resins, paints Lightning Fire Resins    
25 January 
1991 
Arezzo, 
Italy 
Transport 
pipeline 
Landslide Air release Methane  Pipeline rupture  
30 October 
2000 
Sandhurst, 
Gloucester, 
UK 
Waste 
treatment 
(Severe 
storm) 
Flooding 
Fire (smoke 
plume); 
Explosions 
 
Hydrogen 
chloride; 
Phosgene; 
Others 
Mitigation 
taken 
during 
incident 
Initial fire occurred 
during a severe 
storm. Wind or 
lightning could 
Issues highlighted: 
• Storage and 
segregation of 
incompatible 
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Potential 
pollution of 
floodwater 
 
 
prevented 
significant 
release 
have contributed to 
or initiated the 
event 
 
Inappropriate 
storage in 
floodplain 
chemical 
substances and 
waste; 
• Packaging of 
chemical waste 
to prevent 
damage; 
• Procedures for 
receipt and 
classification 
of waste 
materials; 
• The risk of 
flooding at 
major hazard 
sites, many of 
which are 
located close 
to rivers and 
estuaries. 
Since the incident 
there is improved 
land-use-planning 
guidance in 
relation to new 
developments in 
floodplains. 
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ANNEX F – Questionnaire used in the frame of the Natech 
survey 
  
 
 
 
SURVEY OF NATURAL HAZARD-INDUCED CHEMICAL ACCIDENTS 
ALSO KNOWN AS “NATECHS” (NATURAL-HAZARD TRIGGERED 
TECHNOLOGICAL ACCIDENTS)7 
 
The purpose of this survey is to assess Natech risk management practices and awareness of 
Natechs, identify case histories and lessons learned, and identify needs and/or limitations in 
implementing Natech risk reduction strategies in European Union Member States. The results of 
the survey will lead to better designed and targeted Natech risk reduction strategies. 
Needless to say, the success of this survey depends on your contribution. Thus, it is 
important that you answer each question in as complete a way as possible. We understand that 
sometimes the information may not be available or not in the level of detail required by the 
question. In this case, please answer the question to the best of your ability. With this 
questionnaire we want to obtain an overview of the state of Natech risk reduction; some 
questions are therefore very general. If you want to provide additional information or need more 
space to explain your answers please feel free to add as much information as you need. 
Should you have any question about this survey of Natech accidents, please contact 
Elisabeth Krausmann at the JRC (elisabeth.krausmann@jrc.it) 
Please send the completed questionnaire back to the JRC (elisabeth.krausmann@jrc.it) by 
19 June 2009.  
                                                 
7 This questionnaire was prepared by A.M. Cruz and E. Krausmann. 
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Please carefully read the following definition for “Natech” and “chemical accident”: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DEFINITION 
For the purposes of this survey, a “Natech” (natural hazard-triggered technological 
accident) is defined as a chemical accident caused by a natural hazard or a natural 
disaster. 
Chemical accidents include accidental oil and chemical spills, gas releases, and fires or 
explosions involving hazardous substances from fixed establishments (e.g. petrochemical, 
pharmaceutical, pesticide, storage depot), and oil and gas pipelines. 
 
Examples:  the sudden release of anhydrous ammonia from a storage tank due to damage 
caused by an earthquake; chlorine gas release from a broken pipe caused by floating off of a 
storage tank due to flooding; or heavy rain and high winds during a hurricane cause sinking of 
the floating roof on a storage tank exposing naphtha fuel to the atmosphere and to lightning 
strike leading to explosion and fire; etc. 
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SURVEY OF NATURAL HAZARD-INDUCED CHEMICAL ACCIDENTS 
ALSO KNOWN AS NATECHS (NATURAL-HAZARD TRIGGERED 
TECHNOLOGICAL ACCIDENTS) 
 
 
 
I. REGULATIONS FOR THE PREVENTION AND MITIGATION OF NATECHS 
 
WE ASK NATIONAL AUTHORITIES TO ANSWER FOR THEIR COUNTRY, AND INDUSTRY, 
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND OTHER STAKEHOLDERS FOR THEIR 
ORGANIZATION WHERE APPLICABLE 
 
1. Regulations and guidelines for chemical-accident prevention and mitigation 
 
a. Which government institution(s) in your country oversee(s) chemical-accident prevention and 
mitigation? Please provide a brief description of their responsibilities. (Note: If there is more 
than one institution, please list them and their responsibilities.) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
b. Please indicate which rules, codes or guidelines (incl. international agreements) are used in 
your country to regulate or guide hazardous-substances production, use or storage in order to 
prevent or mitigate chemical accidents with impacts on the public and/or the environment.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
c. Do any of these rules, codes and/or guidelines address the natural hazards your country is 
susceptible to? 
 
 Yes    No          
 
If yes, please indicate title and year of the applicable document, type of natural hazard(s) 
considered, and how day-to-day hazardous-substances handling is affected (e.g. no chemical 
storage facilities in floodplains or seismic zones, etc.): 
 
Title and year of document Natural hazard(s) considered Impact on hazardous-
substances handling 
   
   
   
 104
 
d. Does your country/organization have specific technical codes, standards or guidelines for the 
design, construction and operation of buildings and other structures in industry that consider 
natural hazards? 
 
 Yes    No          
 
If yes, please indicate title and year of document and indicate for which natural hazard(s): 
 
Title and year of document Natural hazard(s) considered 
  
  
  
 
 
e. Does your country/organization have a document which provides guidelines specific for 
Natech risk reduction? 
 
 Yes    No          
 
If yes, please indicate title and year of document and indicate for which natural hazard(s): 
 
Title and year of document Natural hazard(s) considered 
  
  
  
 
 
f. Is your country/organization developing a strategy or program to address the problem of 
Natech events? 
 
 Yes       No          
 
If yes, for which natural hazard(s): 
 
 
 
 
2. Natural-disaster management 
 
a. Which government institution(s) in your country oversee(s) natural-disaster management? 
Please provide a brief description of their responsibilities. (Note: If there is more than one 
institution, please list them and their responsibilities.) 
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b. Please indicate which rules, codes and/or guidelines (incl. international agreements) that 
address natural-disaster management are used in your country if any. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
c. Do any of these rules, codes and/or guidelines directly or indirectly restrict hazardous-
substances processing, use or storage in areas subject to natural hazards?  
 
 Yes    No          
 
If yes, please indicate the title and number of the applicable document, the type of natural 
hazard(s) considered, and the impact on hazardous-substances handling:  
 
 
Title and number of 
document 
Natural hazard(s) considered Impact on hazardous-
substances handling 
   
   
   
  
 
3. Effectiveness of regulations 
 
a. In your opinion has your country’s approach to chemical-accident prevention and natural-
disaster management been effective in preventing Natech accidents? Please indicate the level 
of effectiveness by marking a box below (1, low or not effective, and 5, high effectiveness). 
(low)  1--------2---------3--------4--------5 (high) 
 
 
Please explain your answer below. If possible give examples of Natechs that occurred despite 
of, or that were most likely prevented by the introduction of the rules, codes or guidelines: 
 
 
 
 
 
b. Are there any gaps or shortcomings in your country’s rules or codes that should be addressed 
to ensure effective Natech risk reduction? 
 
Please explain: 
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II. NATECH EVENTS DATA COLLECTION AND RETRIEVAL 
 
WE ASK NATIONAL AUTHORITIES TO ANSWER FOR THEIR COUNTRY, AND INDUSTRY, 
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND OTHER STAKEHOLDERS FOR THEIR 
ORGANIZATION WHERE APPLICABLE 
 
4. a. Does your country/organization maintain a database which can be used to record and retrieve 
information on chemical accidents? 
 
 Yes    No          
 
If yes, please describe (name of database, owner, access): 
 
b. If no, does your country/organization keep any type of records (e.g. written reports) of chemical 
accidents? 
 
 Yes       No         
 
5. a. Does your country/organization maintain a Natech-specific database which can be used to record 
and retrieve information about Natech accidents? 
 
 Yes       No          
 
 If yes, please indicate how to access this database (contact person, web link):  
 
b. If no, can the chemical accident records and/or the database indicated in your answer to Question 
II.4 be used to identify and retrieve information about Natech accidents? 
 
 Yes       No          
 
 
 
 
III. LEARNING FROM NATECHS: CASE HISTORIES 
 
WE ASK NATIONAL AUTHORITIES TO ANSWER FOR THEIR COUNTRY, AND INDUSTRY, 
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND OTHER STAKEHOLDERS FOR THEIR 
ORGANIZATION WHERE APPLICABLE 
 
6. Have there been any Natech accidents in your country/organization in the period between 1990 and 
the present? 
 
 Yes     (If yes, go to next question)  No         (If no, go to section IV.) 
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7. We are interested in learning about Natech events that have occurred in your country/organization, 
including near-misses where deemed relevant for lessons learning. We would appreciate if you could 
provide details about each Natech event in the spreadsheet at the end of this questionnaire.  
 
If you prefer you can attach a WORD, EXCEL or PDF file with the description of the Natech events. 
 
 
IV. NATECH AWARENESS AND RISK REDUCTION  
 
WE ASK NATIONAL AUTHORITIES TO ANSWER FOR THEIR COUNTRY, AND INDUSTRY, 
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND OTHER STAKEHOLDERS FOR THEIR 
ORGANIZATION WHERE APPLICABLE 
 
8. Please answer the items below by writing in the box at the end of each item the letter that best reflects 
your opinion.  
 
A 
Disagree Strongly 
B 
Disagree Slightly 
C 
Neutral 
D 
Agree Slightly 
E 
Agree Strongly 
 
a. I was aware of the concept of Natechs before taking this survey. 
 
 
b. Risk managers/ safety professionals in industry in my country/organization are aware of the 
concept of Natechs. 
 
c. Natech events are discussed among those in charge of chemical-accident prevention and 
mitigation in my country/organization. 
 
d. Natechs events are discussed among those in charge of natural-disaster management in my 
country. 
 
e. There is enough emphasis on Natech risk reduction in the laws and regulations for chemical-
accident prevention and mitigation. 
 
f. There is adequate knowledge on the dynamics of Natechs among our country’s competent 
authorities. 
 
g. The relevant competent authorities in my country have adequate training on Natech risk 
reduction to enable effective Natech risk management. 
 
h. Current practices for chemical-accident prevention and mitigation in my country/organization 
provide for adequate protection of citizens against possible Natech events. 
 
i. Current industry risk assessment methods adequately take into consideration Natech events. 
 
 
j. The design and construction of buildings and other structures in industry according to the 
adopted building codes in my country provide sufficient protection against Natech accidents. 
 
 
 
9. In the following questions, please rank your country/organization on a scale of 1-5 (1=low, 
3=moderate, 5=high): 
a. In your opinion, how susceptible is your country/organization to a natural hazard causing a 
chemical accident? 
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(low)  1--------2---------3--------4--------5 (high) 
 
b. What type(s) of natural hazard(s) would you be most concerned about in this context (please 
list all that apply)? 
 
GEOLOGICAL:  
 
 
WEATHER-RELATED: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
c. How satisfied are you with the steps your country/organization has taken to reduce the 
possibility of occurrence of a Natech accident? 
(low)  1--------2---------3--------4--------5 (high) 
           
 
Please explain: why, or why not? 
 
 
 
 
10. Has your country developed Natech risk maps for some or all parts of its territory? 
 
 Yes       No          
 
If yes, please tell us for which natural hazard(s): 
 
 
 
 
11. Has your country/organization developed scenarios for natural hazard-triggered chemical accidents? 
 
 Yes       No          
 
If yes, please describe these Natech scenarios or one of the worst-case Natech scenarios: 
 
 
    
  Earthquake Volcano Landslide Tsunami  Subsidence
  Other (specify):
 High winds: Storm Tornado Hurricane/cyclone/typhoon
  Other (specify):
 Floods: Flash flood River flood Storm surge  Other (specify):
 Extreme temperature and related: Heat Freeze  Snow Ice
  Drought Other (specify):
 Others: Heavy rain Lightning Wildfire  Other (specify):
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12. Are there any Natech risk reduction measures taken in your country/organisation (e.g. consideration 
of natural hazards in operators’ safety documents or emergency plans, in inspections, etc.): 
 
 Yes       No          
 
If yes, please describe them: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
13. Are there any examples of Natech risk reduction measures (prevention, preparedness and response) in 
your country/organization that could be “best practice”? 
 
 Yes       No          
 
If yes, please provide details:  
 
 
 
 
14. Are there any research activities or projects on Natech risk reduction in your country/organization? 
 
 Yes       No          
 
If yes, please provide a short description of the project and the natural hazard(s) considered: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
V. IDENTIFYING NEEDS AND LIMITATIONS 
 
WE ASK NATIONAL AUTHORITIES TO ANSWER FOR THEIR COUNTRY, AND INDUSTRY, 
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND OTHER STAKEHOLDERS FOR THEIR 
ORGANIZATION WHERE APPLICABLE 
 
15. Please indicate which factors (list all that apply) limit your country/organization from including 
Natech prevention strategies in your planning. Please write in the box at the end of each item the 
letter that best reflects your opinion. 
 
A 
Disagree Strongly 
B 
Disagree Slightly 
C 
Neutral 
D 
Agree Slightly 
E 
Agree Strongly 
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a. Lack of awareness  
b. Lack of knowledge  
c. Lack of adequately trained personnel  
d. Lack of adequate resources   
e. Budget constraints  
f. Not the organization’s responsibility  
g. Responsibility not defined   
h. Liability and/or legal issues  
i. Other (Specify):   
 
 
16. Please indicate below what is needed to guarantee effective Natech risk reduction in your 
country/organization. Please write in the box at the end of each item the letter that best reflects your 
opinion. 
 
A 
Disagree Strongly 
B 
Disagree Slightly 
C 
Neutral 
D 
Agree Slightly 
E 
Agree Strongly 
 
a. Training of officials in charge of chemical-accident prevention and mitigation on Natech risk 
reduction is needed. 
 
b. Training of officials in charge of natural disaster management on Natech risk assessment is 
needed. 
 
c. Guidance documents for operators of industrial establishments/installations on Natech risk 
assessment, prevention and mitigation are needed for improved Natech risk reduction. 
 
e. Guidance on Natech risk assessment, prevention and mitigation at the community level is needed 
for improved Natech risk reduction. 
 
f. Natech risk maps to inform land-use-planning decisions and emergency planning are needed. 
 
 
 
17. Are there any other issues that you would like to see addressed to improve Natech risk reduction in 
your country/organization? 
 
 
 
 
 
18. Do organizations or agencies in charge of chemical-accident prevention and mitigation work in 
coordination with organizations in charge of natural-disaster management in your country? 
 
 Yes       No         
 
 
19. In your opinion, is there an overlap of responsibilities between organizations and other agencies that 
affects effective planning for and mitigating Natech events in your country?  
 
 Yes       No         
 
Please explain: 
 111
 
 
 
 
 
 
20. In your opinion, are there gaps in the emergency management of Natechs between government 
agencies in charge of chemical-accident prevention and civil protection authorities in charge of 
natural-disaster management that should be addressed?  
 
 Yes       No         
 
Please explain: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
21. In order to further reduce your country’s or organization’s susceptibility to Natechs, what would be 
your top three Natech risk reduction strategies/recommendations? 
 
1.  
 
2.  
 
3. 
 
 
 
 
V.  BACKGROUND INFORMATION 
 
In order to analyze the data it is important that we have some background information so that we can 
group opinions together.  
 
22. Contact information of the person filling in the questionnaire: 
 
Name: 
Organization: 
Country:  
Address: 
Phone: 
Email: 
 
23. Your organization belongs to: 
 
 112
 a. Public sector [    ]          
  
Please indicate in which area your organization’s responsibilities mainly fall in: 
 
Employment /labor [    ]       Environment [    ]    Civil protection [    ]    
Industry/ Economy [    ]              Public Health [    ] Higher education/ research [    ] 
International development/aid organization [    ] 
Other (please specify): [    ]  
 
Your organization is at which level:  
 
International [    ]    National [    ]        Regional [    ]  Provincial [    ]     Local [    ] 
 
 b. Private sector [    ]    
 
Please indicate in which area your organization’s responsibilities mainly fall in: 
          
Higher education/ research [    ]    Industry/ Manufacturing  [    ]  Engineering  [    ] 
Environmental Consulting [    ]    Services [    ]        
Other (please specify): [    ]  
 
24. What process did you use to complete the answers to this survey (please check all that apply)? 
 
[    ] To answer some questions I used my own knowledge from ______ years of work experience. 
 
[    ] I discussed several/all questions with different colleagues individually. 
 
[    ] I had to look through (or had someone look through) our records to answer some of the 
 questions. 
 
[    ] The questions and answers were discussed in a meeting. 
 
[    ] Other (please specify):  
 
 
Note: In the following lines please list any documents or attachments that you are enclosing with this 
survey. 
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SPREADSHEET 
HAZARDOUS-SUBSTANCES RELEASES CAUSED BY NATURAL HAZARDS AND DISASTERS 
 
SUBSTANCE 
RELEASED 
 
DATE LOCATION TYPE OF 
INDUSTRY
TYPE OF 
NATURAL 
HAZARD/ 
DISASTER 
(e.g. flood, 
earthquake) 
TYPE OF 
RELEASE 
(e.g., air 
release, liquid 
spill, fire, 
explosion, 
etc.) 
Name 
(e.g., 
chlorine) 
Quantity 
released 
(kg) 
FAILURE 
MODE** 
 
LESSONS 
LEARNED 
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
 
** We have provided some examples of potential failure modes below. The list is not exhaustive! 
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EXAMPLE LIST OF POTENTIAL FAILURE MODES 
(Please list in the above spreadsheet all that apply) 
• Structural failure 
• Building collapse 
• Structural failure of passive mitigation systems: containment dikes, enclosure 
• Failure of active mitigation systems: Sprinklers, water curtains 
• Failure of restraining straps 
• Failure of anchoring mechanisms 
• Rupture of pipes and connections 
• Loss of water/water pressure 
• Loss of electricity 
• Loss of heating/boiler failure 
• Loss of cooling/refrigeration 
• Failure of cooling water tower 
• Failure of control mechanisms 
• Over-pressurization 
• Human error 
• Other (Please Specify) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
European Commission 
 
EUR 24661 EN - Joint Research Centre – Institute for the Protection and Security of the Citizen 
Title: Analysis of Natech risk reduction in EU Member States using a questionnaire survey 
Author(s): E. Krausmann 
Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union 
EUR – Scientific and Technical Research series – ISSN 1018-5593 
ISBN 978-92-79-18927-2 
doi:10.2788/82675 
2010 – 118 pp. – 21 x 29.7 cm 
 
Abstract 
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• Raising awareness and improving risk communication at all levels of government and in industry; 
• The implementation and enforcement of specific regulations for Natech risk reduction; 
• The preparation of specific technical codes and of guidelines for risk assessment in industry that address 
the characteristics of Natech risk; 
• The development of guidance on Natech risk assessment at the community level; 
• The development of methods and tools for Natech risk assessment; 
• The preparation of dedicated Natech emergency management plans which consider the characteristics of 
Natech accidents (e.g. a possible lack of utilities); 
• Identification of best practices for Natech risk reduction and wide dissemination of existing practices;  
• The development of Natech risk maps to support effective land-use planning and emergency management; 
• Land-use planning that explicitly addresses Natech risk; 
• Training of competent authorities on Natech risk reduction both for officials in charge of chemical-accident 
prevention and those in charge of natural-disaster management; 
• Research into the impact of climate change on future Natech risk. 
 
In order to support the process of improving Natech risk reduction lessons learned from the analysis of past 
Natech accidents should be formulated and disseminated widely. These lessons should address failure modes 
and hazardous-substance release paths as a function of natural-hazard severity, as well as identify risk-
reduction measures and possible best practices. As this requires the systematic collection of data on the causes 
and dynamics of Natech events the JRC has set up a specific Natech accident database which is public to allow 
the widest possible access to the accident data. Moreover, indicators for measuring the effectiveness and 
adequacy of Natech risk-reduction measures should be developed. 
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